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CLOSING THE ORWELLIAN LOOPHOLE: THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BIG
BROTHER AND THE POTENTIAL FOR A FIRST
AMENDMENT CURE
MATTHEW LYNCH*
ABSTRACT
The setting of George Orwell's 1984 is nothing short of a
nightmare, a dystopian vision of a totalitarian world where democratic
values exist in name only, and the near-total absence of privacy bends
people's behavior, their conversations, and even their minds toward the
government's will. From an American perspective, Orwell's fictional
characters live under a sort of anti-Constitution. The Framers obviously
did not have the benefit of his cautionary tale when they wrote the
Constitution and its Bill of Rights, but their words and explanatory
documents reflect the same fears.
American courts have never weighed the constitutionality of Big
Brother because the government has never implemented such a
surveillance program, at least not on the scale that Orwell imagined.
Voters have never seriously demanded it, and the government has never
before possessed the technological means to make it a reality. Now that
such means are at the government's disposal, Big Brother has never been
closer to realization. From GPS-tracking and satellite-communications
intercepts to facial-recognition cameras and data-mining software, the
government has the means to eavesdrop on virtually any facet of human
life. The persistence and growth of clandestine crimes and societal
threats-from mere software pirating to terrorism and drug trafficking-
creates pressure and temptation for government to use this ever-
. J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 2006; B.A., University of Wisconsin,
2003. I wish to thank William Buss for helpful critiques of two previous drafts of
this Article, and Ed Chaney for his invaluable editorial advice.
improving technology more broadly. The latent nature of such crimes,
combined with their high publicity, creates such public paranoia that
citizens are often willing to trade liberty for an increased sense of
security.
This Article explores two questions. First, it asks whether the
United States Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Constitution
protects us from Big Brother; that is, could a system of government
surveillance on an Orwellian scale-instigated by another major terrorist
attack in the United States-survive judicial scrutiny under current
Supreme Court precedent? To answer this question, the Article evaluates
potential challenges to Big Brother under the Fourth, Fifth, and First
Amendments. Disturbingly, it finds that all leave open the possibility of
constitutionality. In other words, under the right conditions and under
current precedent, no constitutional provision stands firmly between
American citizens and Big Brother.
Second, this Article asks how we can re-think the Constitution so
as to guarantee that Orwell's nightmare could never come to pass. The
answer lies in expanding the scope of what might be the most sacred and
highly-protected of American rights: the First Amendment's right to free
speech. The Article examines the possibility of expanding free speech to
encompass a speaker's right to choose a private audience. Such a
doctrine would close the "Orwellian Loophole" by rendering wholly
unconstitutional any government effort at large-scale, suspicionless
surveillance, thus ensuring that 1984 will remain fiction in the face of
growing temptations to transform it into American reality.
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INTRODUCTION
There was of course no way of knowing whether
you were being watched at any given moment.
How often, or on what system, the Thought Police
plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork.
It was even conceivable that they watched
everybody all the time. But at any rate they could
plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You
had to live-did live, from habit that became
instinct-in the assumption that every sound you
made was overheard, and, except in darkness,
every movement scrutinized.
The thing that he was about to do was to open
a diary. This was not illegal (nothing was illegal,
since there were no longer any laws), but if
detected it was reasonably certain that it would be
punished ....
For some time he gazed stupidly at the
paper.... It was curious that he seemed not merely
to have lost the power of expressing himself, but
even to have forgotten what it was that he had
originally intended to say.
George Orwell wrote 1984 more than fifty years ago, and he died
within a year of its publication. He never lived to see surveillance
cameras, much less cameras with facial-recognition technology. He
never lived to see satellites, much less learn how they would capture
spoken words from one point on earth and instantaneously bounce them
to a point halfway across the globe. He never lived to see home
computers, the Internet, e-mail, e-business, blogs, and myriad new forms
of electronic communications, much less the explosion of "spyware" and
"data mining" programs. Yet Orwell's fictional dystopia-in which he
presents a direct connection between surveillance and the inability to
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 6-7, 9-10 (Plume 1983) (1949).
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think freely-grows more and more relevant as sophisticated
surveillance tools multiply and latent societal threats create pressure on
the government to use such tools.
But surely we could take comfort that this futuristic nightmare
could not happen in the United States. Even if the public demanded such
surveillance measures for security, even if politicians passed laws to
meet this demand, surely the Constitution would protect liberty from this
"insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding. Wouldn't it?
Maybe not. This Article imagines a government surveillance
program of Orwellian scale, an immense technological network for
monitoring the communications and movements of American citizens.
3
Unlike Orwell, however, we do not have to fantasize about the tools of
this surveillance; this Article's hypothetical merely applies presently-
available technology (or logical extensions of presently-available
technology) on a nationwide scale. Under such a system, citizens must
assume that every communication by verbal or technological means-
personal conversations, phone calls, e-mails, faxes, Internet postings-is
subject to government review, even though there is no way to know the
criteria by which the government's computerized filtration system flags
certain communications and patterns for human review.
The government's purposes in this hypothetical program are
national security and safety, namely the prevention of terrorist attacks
and other serious, clandestine threats to the country. It does not seek to
suppress or deter speech; indeed, the system is more effective when
people speak freely. Relevant speech may be used as evidence in
criminal proceedings after a crime takes place, and other suspicious
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
3. This hypothetical assumes that the new search program would supersede the
Privacy Act, which prohibits any government agency from "maintain[ing a] record
describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment... unless pertinent to and within the authorized scope of an authorized
law enforcement activity." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (2000) (alteration added). While
the records created under the hypothetical surveillance program described above
would likely fall within the Privacy Act, the applicability of the Privacy Act to this
hypothetical lies beyond the scope of this Article.
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communications may bring a variety of non-criminal consequences, such
as increased surveillance by local law enforcement.
This hypothetical is not necessarily the legislature's most likely
response to a terrorist disaster, nor are the government's methods and
discipline in executing this program the most reflective of human nature.
It is a common maxim that absolute power corrupts absolutely, and those
in power would have absolute access to all of the formerly private
information generated by this program. In this hypothetical, if absolute
power corrupts even marginally and this corruption becomes known to
opponents of the program, the constitutional analysis in this Article must
shift considerably and courts would likely repel the government's
invasion of privacy. The mission here, however, is not to evaluate the
constitutional safeguards against the strongest Constitution-battering
storm that would likely occur if the country suffered another terrorist
attack. Rather, it is to evaluate the safeguards against the "perfect
storm," a combination of circumstances and conditions that presents
great threats to liberty but lacks the kinds of human abuse and corruption
that would lead to reasonable questioning of the government's motives.
It is a "stress test" for the Constitution.
Unfortunately, under the United States Supreme Court's present
interpretation, the Constitution may fail this test. Even though this
country ratified the Bill of Rights to guarantee our liberty from such
totalitarian measures,4 the Supreme Court's current interpretation of that
document reveals a paradox: under proper circumstances, today's Court
could uphold a nationwide surveillance program of Orwellian
proportions. This Article explores this "Orwellian Loophole," examining
the possibility that the Supreme Court would uphold Orwell's nightmare
against constitutional challenges under the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment, and the First Amendment's rights to expressive association
and free speech generally.
4. See James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives, Proposing the
Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789) ("[I]f all power is subject to abuse that then it is
possible the abuse of the powers of the General Government may be guarded against
in a more secure manner than is now done .... I do wish to see a door opened.., to
incorporate those provisions for the security of rights ...."), reprinted in part in
JUHANI RUDANKO, JAMES MADISON AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: MAJOR DEBATES IN
THE EARLY REPUBLIC 34 (2004) (alteration added).
2007] 239
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Having found a distinct possibility of constitutionality, this
Article concludes by suggesting a new approach to free speech under the
First Amendment: the recognition of the speaker's choice of audience as
an element of the freedom of speech. It shows how this right fits within
the Court's current justifications for free speech generally, protects
against government surveillance, and effectively closes the Orwellian
Loophole.
On a larger scale and regardless of the solution for the Orwellian
Loophole, this Article also seeks to inspire courts to awaken from their
current slumber on this issue. They must close this loophole, this
widening crack between Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, and
right-to-privacy protections where this program might hide from strong
judicial scrutiny under the current interpretation of the Constitution. If
they do not, the combined growth of both technological capabilities and
societal fears threaten to turn Orwell's nightmare into American reality.
I. THE ORWELL ACT
After the 9/11 attacks, civil libertarians denounced reactionary
legislation that granted greater surveillance powers to the government at
the same time it permitted more threatening usage of the information
through greater inter-agency coordination. But if Americans proved
willing to support the government in efforts that went as far as those
measures did, what kinds of new surveillance policies and programs
might Americans support if terrorists strike again in another organized,
catastrophic attack from within American borders?
The extent of the response would likely be some function of the
asserted needs of government agencies, the tools at the government's
disposal, and the level of public outcry for stronger security, but none
can doubt that the government would respond. This Article envisions an
5. See Kevin Galvin, Rights and Wrongs: Why New Law Enforcement Powers
Worry Civil Libertarians, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at A3 (noting the concerns
of civil libertarians over the recently-passed Patriot Act legislation); see also USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 tit. II, VII, IX, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at FED. R.
CRM. P. 6 and 41 and scattered sections of Titles 18, 22, 28, 42, 47, and 50 of the
United States Code) (providing for increased federal surveillance powers, state and
federal government law-enforcement coordination, and inter-agency intelligence
sharing).
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extraordinary legislative response to the public demand for greater
security, appropriately labeled the "Orwell Act."
The Orwell Act authorizes the federal government to eavesdrop
upon every kind of spoken and written communication in widespread use
today in the United States. The Act authorizes the government to tap
every phone line, intercept every cell-phone and radio transmission, and
capture every email. It may install hidden, voice-activated microphones
in every public place, and it may purchase the option of placing hidden
microphones in every room of every private building.6  Voice-
recognition technology matches voice samples with recorded
conversations, making it possible for the government to keep a running
transcript of all spoken words and the identities of the speakers.
Mandatory software "backdoors" enable the government to read every
document stored on every computer. A series of hidden facial-
recognition cameras can record the movements of every citizen, and
Global Positioning System ("GPS") trackers can record the movements
of every automobile. The government's system can detect any tampering
with any of these devices immediately, and such tampering constitutes a
grave criminal offense.
The government collects data using an advanced computer
system and shrouds the use of this data in a veil of secrecy. It introduces
some communications in criminal trials. It shares other information with
local law enforcement. But these uses are inconsistent and uncertain,
and defendants are often left to speculate whether witnesses against them
came forward on their own accord or were discovered with Orwell Act
surveillance. Indeed, no one knows how much data the system collects,
with some believing it collects and stores all movement and
communication and others arguing that--due to the inconsistent and
uncertain appearance of Orwell Act evidence in criminal trials-it
collects only scattered or targeted communications at any one time.
While all agree that the computer system must use some kind of program
to filter through such massive amounts of information and discern the
6. The government must buy this right due to the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and the Supreme Court's ruling in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that "a
permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard
to the public interests that it may serve").
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most threatening symptoms of danger, no one outside of a handful of
government employees knows which words or movements capture the
system's attention at any particular time. It is, in short, the Panopticon,
7
the Leviathan, 8 the Big Brother of George Orwell's nightmares.
9
The Orwell Act functions even better than legislators had hoped:
crime evaporates in its midst, as no criminals feel secure in the face of its
ever-present eyes and ears. Terrorists stay abroad; abusive husbands
hold their fists; drug traffickers abandon their trade. The Orwell Act
becomes Congress's D-Day in its metaphorical wars on crime, drugs, and
terrorism.
But some citizens--dubbed the Anti-Orwellians--question
whether this crime-free society is truly utopian, and they file lawsuits
challenging the Orwell Act on constitutional grounds. The Supreme
Court hears a consolidated appeal of these cases, with appellants making
different objections to the Orwell Act, and the justices must answer the
question that grips the nation's attention: in a country founded on
constitutionally-protected freedom, can the Orwell Act survive
constitutional scrutiny? What constitutional claims might protect against
its threat to destroy privacy in America?
II. CLAIM No. 1: OLD (UN)RELIABLE-THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Fourth Amendment Lines to Fourth Amendment Scales
The Fourth Amendment has traditionally protected against such
incursions into the private realm, at least since the Supreme Court's
landmark 1967 holding in Katz v. United States10 that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people, not places."'1 In Katz, the Court ruled that
police officers must comply with the Fourth Amendment's warrant
7. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon, in THE PANOPTICON
WRITINGS 29-95 (Verso, 1995) (1787) (describing a prison designed to give inmates
the impression that they are under constant surveillance).
8. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Penguin 1985) (1651)
(describing the need for an all-powerful state, or Leviathan, to preserve peace in
light of the human tendency toward conflict).
9. See generally ORWELL, supra note 1.
10. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. Id. at351.
[Vol. 5242
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requirement to wiretap a payphone used by a criminal suspect. 2 More
broadly, it held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.
Since that time, the Court seems to have engaged in a concerted
effort to limit the Katz ruling.14 Moreover, in the era following Katz but
before the explosion of cases linked with Terry v. Ohio,15 the Court
struggled to draw clear lines in its search jurisprudence. For example,
the test of whether the government conducted a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment was and remains highly malleable: it
is a two-prong analysis of whether a person had a subjective expectation
of privacy in the place being searched, and whether society is prepared to
recognize that expectation as "reasonable" or "legitimate."' 16 Certainly,
such a test gives judges some leeway to make results-oriented
determinations in certain cases.17 But at least the older, pre-Terry
approach carried some absolutes once a court found that a search took
place. If there was no probable cause, the search was per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 8 Absent a warrant, the
search was per se unreasonable in many situations. If there was no
individualized suspicion, the search was always unreasonable.
20
12. Id. at 358.
13. Id. at 357.
14. In doing so, the Court has created numerous addenda to those "few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement,
so many that even the current Court's (arguably) most conservative member
recognizes that "the warrant requirement ha[s] become so riddled with exceptions
that it [i]s basically unrecognizable." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582
(1982) (Scalia, J., concurring) (alterations added).
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. For example, the Court ruled that police using binoculars and low-flying
airplanes to investigate private property immediately surrounding a suspect's home
were not conducting "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even
when physically walking over the same space (or, perhaps, flying at a lower altitude)
would have constituted a search. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
18. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1969).
19. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (explaining that "the Constitution requires 'that the
deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . .be interposed between the
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Gradually, the Court has traded this world of Fourth Amendment
absolutes for a world of Fourth Amendment balancing. This newer
approach evaluates Fourth Amendment reasonableness on a sliding scale,
examining "all the circumstances 2 '-the nature of the search or
character of the intrusion, the legitimacy of the subject's privacy
22
expectations, and the government interests in conducting the search.
While this approach avoids formalism and gives courts flexibility to
evaluate new types of searches, it also gives the government great ability
to conduct the kind of generalized, suspicionless searches that inspired
the Fourth Amendment in the first place.23
In fact, the Court has developed a "special needs" catch-all
category for generalized searches that would otherwise face eradication
under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, such as random drug
24 25testing, highway sobriety checkpoints, and the mandatory DNA
sampling of convicted criminals.26 "Special needs" searches carry only
one extra limitation on their use beyond the normal reasonableness
analysis: their purpose must be "'[]distinguishable from the general
interest in crime control.', 27  But even this requirement is open to
citizen and the police .... (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
481-482 (1963))).
20. No case upheld the constitutionality of a generalized, suspicionless search
until United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).
21. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
22. Justice Scalia has been the main proponent of this three-part balancing test.
See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-61 (1995); Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
23. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 U.
MICH L. REv. 547, 577, 582 (1999) (arguing that the Framers wrote the Fourth
Amendment to protect against arbitrary, generalized searches through the
requirements for warrants and probable cause).
24. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 665 (finding "special needs"and
upholding a school district program of random drug testing for student athletes).
25. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990)
(upholding state program of sobriety checkpoints to prevent drunk driving).
26. See United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1083 (2003) (upholding the federal DNA Backlog Elimination Act
of 2000 under a "special needs" analysis).
27. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001) (alteration added)
(quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)). The Court stated
that it "consider[s] all the available evidence in order to determine the relevant
primary purpose." Id. (alteration added). If the primary purpose includes "the threat
[Vol. 5244
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inconsistent interpretation. For example, the Supreme Court upheld a
local law-enforcement policy of random sobriety checkpoints without
28
any real inquiry into the purpose of that program, but it struck down a
program of drug checkpoints because their "primary purpose was to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. 2 9  A principled
distinction between these cases is hard to find, and it seems that
constitutionality rests only upon how forthcoming law-enforcement
officials choose to be with regard to the purposes of the program at issue.
B. The Orwell Act Under the Fourth Amendment
Given the Court's move toward balancing, the Orwell Act could
very well navigate the few remaining obstacles under today's Fourth
Amendment. First, Orwell-Act opponents would have difficulty proving
a subjective and legitimate expectation of privacy. Because of the
Orwell Act's public nature-all citizens know they are subject to
constant surveillance, and they know the means by which the
government's watchful eyes and ears operate-the Court could hold that
no subjective expectation of privacy exists. 30  Even if the Anti-
Orwellians can show subjective expectations of privacy, they may not be
able to show that such expectations are legitimate. In United States v.
Place,31 the Supreme Court ruled that a sniff by a dog trained to detect
narcotics did not constitute a search because "the sniff discloses only the
presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.",32 Because no one
has a legitimate expectation of privacy as to his or her narcotics, and
because the dog sniff can only detect narcotics, then the sniff is not a
search of something in which the suspect possesses a legitimate
of arrest and prosecution," the search "does not fit within the closely guarded
category of 'special needs."' Id. at 84.
28. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
29. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38.
30. The Supreme Court has given little attention to the "subjective
expectations" prong since Justice Harlan first described it in his concurrence to Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967), perhaps because it is so rarely at
issue. The Court has never dealt with the kind of program at issue in the Orwell Act,
however, and the very fact that the Court has never expressly disavowed it leaves
open an argument that some justices could use to uphold the Act.
31. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
32. ld. at 707.
2007]
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expectation of privacy. These types of "binary" 33 searches have been the
subject of some renewed debate on the Court34 and among
commentators, including one who poses the question of whether a
computer-monitoring system that scans all computers only for illegal
material could withstand constitutional scrutiny.35
Such reasoning militates against the legitimacy of the Anti-
Orwellians' assertions of privacy expectations. In effect, Orwell-Act
technology could simulate the special abilities of a drug-sniffing dog:
while it is so advanced that criminal activity cannot escape its watch, it is
so precise that it eliminates the majority of opportunities for human
discretion and abuse. While these devices gather a huge amount of
information that society would consider private, only a small amount
would ever receive the attention of human law-enforcement officers. If
computer filtration can limit this information to communications and
movements that are illegitimate-"contraband" speech such as
incitement and speech that is by its nature evidence of criminal
activity-then the Court may find that these searches are binary and not
open to widespread abuse.
If the Anti-Orwellians survive this preliminary analysis under the
Fourth Amendment, they face the uncertain dangers of the "special-
needs" balancing act. Given the events precipitating the Orwell Act, the
Court will likely find the Act's primary purpose to be safety and national
security rather a general interest in crime control. 36 Because the Court
33. They are termed "binary" because they can only reveal one of two results,
the presence or absence of illegal items. See generally Ric Simmons, The Two
Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make the World Safe for
Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REv. 411 (2005).
34. See generally United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (upholding a
chemical field test for narcotics, with a vigorous dissent from Justices Brennan and
Marshall and a skeptical concurrence from Justice White).
35. See generally Michael Adler, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital
Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net- Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093
(1996).
36. In essence, the government must argue that the Orwell Act program more
closely resembles Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990)
(upholding highway sobriety checkpoints), and Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419,
427-28 (2004) (upholding highway checkpoints to question potential witnesses
following a recent crime), than City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37
places great emphasis on the stated programmatic purpose of "special
needs" searches,37 the government need only state a purpose of
protecting American lives from terrorist acts-with the discovery of
evidence of criminal activities unrelated to terrorism merely a byproduct
of an effective anti-terrorism program-and the Orwell Act could pass
this low initial barrier into the "special needs" category of searches.
Once it enters this category, the unpredictable balancing of
privacy interests and government needs begins. The very structure of the
balancing test, however, weighs against the Anti-Orwellians. In more
than twenty years of applying the "special needs" test, the Court has
never struck down a search program after it has determined that the
program targets "special needs, beyond the need for normal law
enforcement."
38
The lopsided nature of the balancing test is to blame.
Generalized search programs are by nature less intrusive because no
individual receives the full attention of law-enforcement authorities;
indeed, the Court views a lack of officer discretion as a factor weighing
against intrusiveness.39 By this reasoning, if everyone is subject to the
same program, then the intrusiveness of each search diminishes in
proportion to the number of individuals exposed to the search, because
(2000) (striking down highway drug checkpoints). If another 9/11 occurs, thus
exposing national security needs and deficiencies, this task would not be difficult.
37. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42 (basing its holding on the "programmatic
purpose" of drug checkpoints to detect criminal activity, rather than protect public
safety on the highways).
38. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351-52 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). The Court has struck down a few programs in which the government
asserted "special needs," but each of these cases was decided at the initial stage of
determining whether the program confronted special needs, rather than general crime
control. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (holding that a
program requiring new mothers to submit to drug tests "does not fit within the
closely guarded category of 'special needs'); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42 (finding
no "special needs" in a police checkpoint to search cars for narcotics); Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (holding that "special needs" did not apply to a
state law requiring political candidates to submit to drug tests because "public safety
is not genuinely in jeopardy").
39. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454 (noting that the lack of officer discretion added to
the reasonableness of a sobriety checkpoint) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979)).
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suspicionless, standardized searches are less subject to official abuse40
and cause less insult to personal dignity.41 To illustrate, we accept
searches of our luggage and personal belongings at airport security
checkpoints because we understand that they are part of a larger,
standardized search program, and we know that a security officer's
perusal of our bags is not akin to an accusation of wrongdoing. If a pair
of security officers approaches us at an airport restaurant and performs
the same search, however, we would likely feel a greater violation of our
privacy purely because we feel as if we are being singled out as worthy
of suspicion.
In addition, the weight of the government interests tends to grow
exponentially with the scope and effectiveness of the search program.
For example, the dissenters in Sitz minimized the governmental needs for
highway sobriety checkpoints by arguing that the checkpoints were equal
to or less effective than "more conventional means. 42 If the Orwell Act
is perfectly effective in stopping terrorism-as our hypothetical posits-
then the clearly compelling need to combat terrorism and the highly
effective means of the Orwell Act combine to place a heavy weight on
the "government interests" side of the Fourth Amendment scale.
Even if the program was not especially effective in eliminating
all terrorist acts, it is possible that the Court would still uphold it.
Understandably, the justices would not want to take the blame or feel the
guilt that would arise should another terrorist attack occur after they
struck down the Orwell Act. The Court's anxiety regarding its
countermajoritarian nature seems to correlate with the perceived gravity
of the consequences of its interference with the other branches; as some
of its most highly criticized decisions reveal (Dred Scott43 and
Korematsu4 foremost among them), well-reasoned and probing judicial
40. Id.
41. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical
Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE L.J. 727,
766 (1993) (noting evidence to support an "inference of guilt" theory; that is, the
more an individual senses that he is being singled-out as worthy of suspicion, the
more he perceives the search as intrusive).
42. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
44. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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review gives way to result-oriented deference when a contrary decision
could result in violence or chaos.45 When precedent leaves room to
maneuver and the stakes are high, the Court tends to side with an
interpretation of the Constitution that the other branches of the
government believe best protects national security.
Finally, even if the Court finds that the government interest pales
in comparison to any privacy interests, and it rules against the Orwell
Act, Anti-Orwellians face another practical difficulty: the limitations of
the exclusionary rule. While a ruling that strikes down Orwell-Act
searches on Fourth Amendment grounds might bar the admission of a
defendant's own recorded conversations in a court proceeding, it would
not bar the admission of the evidence gained by listening to the
conversations of others, because defendants have no standing to object to
46
violations of the privacy of others. For example, in the prosecution of a
drug dealer, the government could collect recorded communications of
all of the drug dealer's associates. Suppose an associate calls another
associate and tells him that the dealer expects a new shipment to arrive at
a certain time and location. The government could send officers to that
location to arrest the dealer as he makes the purchase; it could convince
the associates to testify against the dealer; and it could even introduce the
associates' conversations against the dealer at trial (subject, of course, to
the limitations of the Confrontation Clause and rules of evidence). Other
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, such as attenuation47 and the
48independent source doctrine, give the government opportunities to use
45. Of course, one can make the argument that both Dred Scott and Korematsu
are more a result of judges',racial animosity than countermajoritarian anxiety. The
Court's free-speech rulings during the Red Scare-in which it upheld the
government's denial of liberty based on political identity rather than racial identity-
offer some support for the conclusion that there is more behind Dred Scott and
Korematsu than mere racism. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927) (upholding petitioner's criminal conviction based on her membership in the
Communist Labor Party of California, where the purpose of such membership was to
associate with fellow members to accomplish illegal aims); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding petitioner's criminal conviction based on his
publication of a Socialist Party manifesto that advocated the illegal overthrow of the
United States government).
46. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969).
47. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
48. See Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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the fruits of unlawful searches of the defendant himself. In short, the
holes in the exclusionary rule give the government little incentive to
abandon such a powerful means of uncovering evidence of criminal
activity.
Thus, the Fourth Amendment is a shaky foundation upon which
to build a challenge to the Orwell Act. Recent changes in the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment analysis present major obstacles to any
opponents of the Act, and exclusionary-rule jurisprudence means that
success on the merits does not necessarily preclude the government from
utilizing Orwell-Act surveillance. Of course, opponents may still bring
civil Bivens suits against the federal government for a deprivation of
constitutional rights.49 But such suits are a product of federal common
law, rather than the Constitution; conceivably, the government could
amend or abolish this recourse for Anti-Orwellians if these suits
presented any serious inconvenience to the government's search efforts.
Thus, for true protection against the Orwell Act, its opponents would be
well-advised to look beyond the Fourth Amendment's ever-shrinking
scope of protection.
III. CLAIM NO. 2: NEW (UN)RELIABLE-THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Rather than tying their constitutional hopes to a right with a
shrinking scope of protection, perhaps it would be wiser for Anti-
Orwellians to employ a right that has undergone a recent expansion: 50 the
right to privacy. This "right," which falls under the "substantive force of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause"5' of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 52 does not explicitly appear within the
49. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(establishing a federal cause of action for violations of Fourth Amendment rights by
federal officers).
50. I base this speculation on the outcome of one of the Court's most well-
recognized decisions of the new millennium, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), which overruled a previous decision that placed some limitations on the right
to privacy, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
51. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
52. Because this Article envisions the Orwell Act as a federal law, the Fifth
Amendment applies. The cases cited in this section discuss the right to privacy in
terms of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, depending upon whether the
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Constitution. But the Court has used it to strike down some laws-
primarily morals legislation, at least in the post-Lochner era-with
broad, sweeping language that could give hope to Anti-Orwellians:
Our precedents "have respected the private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter." These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.53
Based upon this paragraph alone, the Orwell Act seems like a
government venture into unconstitutional waters. While constant
surveillance may not dictate the "choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy" in the same sense that the criminalization of one of those
choices would, one could argue that individuals should be free to "define
one's own concept of existence" without the government looking over
their shoulders. They may argue that true dignity, autonomy, and liberty
require some breathing room, some private space where people can rest
assured that their lawful words and actions will not fall within the
government spotlight.
But there are limits to the application of these broad-stroke
principles. The Court does not apply such liberty-promoting statements
consistently, and the task of convincing the Court to overrule some
government action on substantive due-process grounds is not as simple
as fitting it under the wide umbrella of generous dicta.54 The Court
claimant is fighting federal or state government, but the analysis of the right to
privacy is the same.
53. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
54. Certainly the decision to end one's life, for example, is a choice
encompassing elements of dignity, liberty, and autonomy, but the Court declined to
strike down Washington's assisted suicide law as a violation of due process.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735-36 (1997).
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instead relies upon a two-step approach to substantive due process
claims: first, the asserted right must be one of "those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,"' and second, the Court must be able to make a
"'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest., 55 Of
course, not all abstract claims of rights require constitutional protection
and recognition from the Court; these purported rights must, in some
way, find some basis in the text of the Constitution56 or American historyS 57
and practice, or perhaps some kind of reasoned consensus that the right
,,58
warrants protection in an "organized society .
55. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
("I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit
that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific
constitutional provision.").
57. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("In determining which rights are
fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and
private notions. Rather, they must look to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience
of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] . . .as to be
ranked as fundamental."') (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
58. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In my view, the proper constitutional
inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."') (citation omitted); see also Casey, 505
U.S. at 834 ("Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption marks the outer limits of the substantive
sphere of such 'liberty.' Rather, . . . this Court [may] exercise its reasoned judgment
in determining the boundaries between the individual's liberty and the demands of
organized society.") (alteration added). Chief Justice Warren's alternative holding in
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), a case striking down Virginia's anti-
miscegenation law, may provide an example of this line of reasoning. The
Constitution mentions no right to interracial marriage, nor did American history at
the time suggest any longstanding exercise of a right to marry outside one's race.
Nevertheless, Warren wrote that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.... To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes . . . is surely to deprive all the State's
citizens of liberty without due process of law." Id. at 12 (alteration added).
A. A Right in Search of a Definition
In this case, the Anti-Orwellians could take two approaches.
First, they could define their claim within an already-established right,
such as the right to marital privacy59 or the right of an adult to engage in
consensual sexual relations with another adult6 (they may also claim that
it violates their fundamental free-speech rights under the First
Amendment, and this Article will deal with that issue in the next
section). They would simply argue that the Orwell Act violates these
rights because it infringes upon "the liberty relating to intimate
relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or
bear a child.
' 61
The problem with this approach is that the Orwell Act prohibits
nothing. Citizens remain free to make reproductive decisions, engage in
intimate relations, and raise their families as they see fit, so long as their
conduct does not involve abuse, neglect, or other well-established
criminal violations. The Orwell Act does not regulate these matters such
that the government removes choice from the hands of the citizens; if
reproductive decision-making is a constitutional right, the Orwell Act on
its face does nothing to ban the exercise of that right.
This is not to say that the Orwell Act could not violate these
rights with regard to specific unconstitutional applications in specific,
62limited contexts. But such misuse of the gathered information would
not render the entire Act unconstitutional; a favorable ruling would
merely prohibit the government from using the information in that way.
The key question then becomes whether the government, acting only as a
silent observer and listening in on family life, telephone calls, and
59. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
60. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
62. If the government began publishing and distributing lists of who was
sleeping with whom using information obtained through the Orwell Act, Lawrence
suggests that such measures would violate the right to sexual privacy. Even though
same-sex sodomy carried a minor penalty in Texas, the Court noted that "the
consequential nature of the punishment and the state-sponsored condemnation
attendant to criminal prohibition" created a violation of the right. Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 576. State-sponsored publication of this information could amount to de
facto "state-sponsored condemnation" akin to criminal prosecution, and thus violate
this right.
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important conversations, effectively deprives Americans of the free
exercise of their fundamental rights. It is certainly a plausible argument,
considering that the Court often uses spatial metaphors to describe the
breadth of the right ("realm of personal liberty, 63 and "zone of privacy"
64
are two of the most oft-cited examples).
But it may also conclude that the mere presence of hidden
surveillance equipment transmitting data to faceless computer banks
miles away, with no penalty for the lawful exercise of these rights, does
not amount to any meaningful deprivation of these rights at all. Women
will still have the freedom to obtain abortions and couples may still
engage in intimate relations. If the worst-case scenario for citizens is
that some nameless, unknown strangers working for the government
miles away might see transcripts or listen to recordings of the citizens
practicing their lawful rights, without any authorization to disclose the
information, then any purported deprivation of these rights could be too
speculative to hold up in the Supreme Court.
B. Making Things Up as They Go Along
Anti-Orwellians may choose to pursue a more novel approach
and argue for a "new" application of the right to privacy under
substantive due process, but such an argument will hinge on the "'carefulS ,65
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." Anti-
Orwellians might seek to define their right against the Orwell Act as a
right to private communication, a right to physical privacy, or perhaps a
right to a private life, or at least the right to a possibility of a private life
sometimes. Implicit in each of these definitions are concepts of personal
autonomy, dignity, and spatial freedom-the idea that "fundamental is
the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
63. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847.
64. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
65. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted).
For example, the Court examined nearly identical anti-sodomy laws in Lawrence and
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Court labeled the asserted
right as the "right to engage in homosexual sodomy" and denied the substantive due-
process claim. Id. at 191. In Lawrence, the Court labeled the same asserted right as
the "right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct," Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 565, and granted the substantive due-process claim.
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governmental intrusions into one's privacy." The opening lines of
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence eloquently capture this
spirit:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other
private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the
home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty
of the person both in its spatial and more
67transcendent dimensions.
Again, however, there are limits to the application of these
platitudes in the surveillance context. There is no evidence that any of
the above definitions of a due-process right have ever been fundamental
rights. They certainly do not appear in the text of the Constitution. The
Court has never recognized a general "right to privacy," period, but only
privacy in certain contexts: the right to privacy in certain marital
decisions,68 or the right to privacy in sexuality,69 or the right to watch
movies and read books in private even if it may not be legal to view them
in public. 70 These limitations are necessary for a functioning society.
We can support a general right to free speech with few exceptions
because its harms to society are minimal and its benefits great; we cannot
support a general right to privacy because its potential harms are great
and benefits to society as a whole arguably minimal.
7
'
66. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
67. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
68. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
69. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
70. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
71. The modem critics of a broad right to privacy run the ideological gamut,
and each finds that privacy offers great dangers and minimal benefits to society in
certain contexts. See, e.g., AMITAi ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 183 (1999)
(looking at privacy through a communitarian perspective and finding that "there are
times when our commitment to privacy endangers public health and safety. In four
2007]
Of course, the Court may simply take a slightly less general
approach and define the right as "the right to privacy with regard to
unwarranted government surveillance." Such a definition is broad
enough to apply to the Orwell Act in its entirety. It is still fairly abstract,
but it might conceivably have enough specificity to avoid absurd results
in future cases. The problem for Anti-Orwellians would lie in
convincing the Court that such a right is fundamental. The Constitution
suggests a right to be free from unwarranted government surveillance in
the Fourth Amendment, but the Fourth Amendment addresses only
searches and seizures. As Part II illustrates, the Fourth Amendment
might not bar the Orwell Act's surveillance program. In addition,
American history does not support a right to be free from unwarranted
government surveillance. The government has engaged in domestic
spying since the Revolutionary War,72 and the Supreme Court itself
recognized, in United States v. United States District Court (Keith), that
"[t]he use of ... [electronic] surveillance ... has been sanctioned more
or less continuously by various Presidents and Attorneys General since
July 1946." 73 That same case struck down a program of warrantless
domestic surveillance, but it did so upon Fourth Amendment grounds-
grounds that have shifted significantly since the Court decided Keith in
1972, due to the rise of the balancing approach and the growing judicial
acceptance of evidence from warrantless searches in criminal cases.7 4 In
short, United States history reveals no strong tradition outlawing
unwarranted government surveillance; if anything, that history-at least
of the five areas studied here-and in several other areas mentioned along the way-
the common good was being neglected to protect privacy."); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 194 (1989) ("This right to
privacy is a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a time.")
(footnote omitted); RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 309 (2d ed. 1983)
(finding that the "privacy legislation movement remains a puzzle from an economic
standpoint").
72. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE (1997), available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/warindep/
frames.html.
73. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972)
(alteration added) (citation omitted).
74. See supra Part II.A (describing the Court's recasting of the Fourth
Amendment over the past forty years).
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prior to the Court's now-dubious Fourth Amendment ruling in 1972-
reveals the opposite.75
In sum, obstacles abound in any effort to save the nation from
the Orwell Act via the right to privacy: the Court has split badly over the
appropriateness of invoking the right to privacy in recent years,76 efforts
to forge new dimensions of the right to privacy are fraught with legal
hurdles, and efforts to fit this claim within existing dimensions of the
right to privacy may not succeed in showing a deprivation of those
rights. Finally, even if the claim succeeds, the scope of the victory
probably would not demand complete annihilation of the Orwell Act.
More likely, the Court would rule that certain activities under the Act
were unconstitutional while others could remain. The victory would be
meaningful for the Anti-Orwellians, but it would serve only as a prelude
to future battles over the tools and scope of government surveillance
rather than a battle over the propriety of such a system itself.
IV. CLAIM No. 3: OLD RELIABLE, SOMETIMES-THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
If the Fourth Amendment and the due-process right to privacy
cannot slay the Orwell Act, its opponents may look to a more creative
approach utilizing the most sacred of constitutional rights: the rights to
free speech and association under the First Amendment. Such an
approach may seem counterintuitive considering that opponents to
privacy-enhancing statutes, such as news reporters, often challenge them
on First Amendment right-of-access or right-to-publish-information
grounds. 77 Indeed, in The Death of Privacy?, Michael Froomkin details
a frightening array of government and private surveillance technologies
and efforts before asking whether a statute to restrict such efforts would
75. See infra Part IV.B.1 (outlining the history of warrantless domestic
surveillance in the United States).
76. For example, the Lawrence case was a 6-3 decision with only five justices
deciding the case on substantive due process grounds. The Casey case garnered only
a plurality.
77. See generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (challenging the
application of the federal wiretap statute to members of the media).
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pass First Amendment scrutiny. But he does not discuss whether the
First Amendment might actually require protection from surveillance, or
at least from surveillance by the government.
This omission is not unwarranted. Cases challenging
government surveillance on First Amendment grounds are relatively rare,
and such cases rarely reach the merits of the First Amendment claim.
Considering the extensive and widely condemned history of federal
government surveillance throughout the Twentieth and early Twenty-
First Centuries, this fact is nothing less than remarkable. 79 Nevertheless,
like the right to privacy, dicta in some cases suggest that a First
Amendment objection to the Orwell Act may find some success if it can
reach the merits. Perhaps the most optimistic dictum comes from Keith,
a Fourth Amendment case:
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a
dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance
power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official
eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and
discussion of Government action in private
conversation. For private dissent, no less than open
public discourse, is essential to our free society.80
Unfortunately for the Anti-Orwellians, the case did not go as far
as this statement suggests; the Court merely ruled that the government
must follow the warrant requirement to conduct surveillance under its
powers over domestic security. 81  As discussed above, the Fourth
82Amendment's warrant requirement has eroded since Katz. Despite this
subsequent shift in the Fourth Amendment, the language above suggests
a spirit of judicial suspicion of government surveillance as to the First
Amendment-a spirit that points to the unconstitutionality of the Orwell
Act. But first, the Anti-Orwellians must traverse the uncertain pretrial
jungle of standing.
78. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1461,
1501, 1506-20 (2000).
79. See generally Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political
Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 621 (2004).
80. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
81. Id. at 321.
82. See supra Part II.A.
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The standing issue presents unique problems for Anti-Orwellians
because the Orwell Act does not fit the mold of most laws that fall victim
to the First Amendment. By its terms, the Act does not criminalize any
speech, nor does it compel any citizen to profess beliefs that he does not
believe. In fact, it better serves the Act's purpose of protecting national
security if all people freely profess their true beliefs, because the Orwell
Act cannot protect the public from a silent terrorist. Nor does it
discriminate against any particular speech on the basis of content or
viewpoint, at least on its face; it captures all communications regardless
of subject matter. In short, the Act is not directed at speech, at least
under the Court's current understanding of the doctrine, nor does it
regulate conduct. The Act does not truly require speakers to open their
speech to government surveillance; it simply gives the government the
power to listen. As the Court stated in Bowens v. Roy, 83 a case that threw
out a free-exercise challenge brought by Stephen Roy to enjoin the
government from using the Social Security number of his daughter, Little
Bird of the Snow:
Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted
the First Amendment to require the Government
itself to behave in ways that the individual believes
will further his or her spiritual development or that
of his or her family .... The Free Exercise Clause
affords an individual protection from certain forms
of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an
individual a right to dictate the conduct of the
Government's internal procedures .... The Federal
Government's use of a Social Security number for
Little Bird of the Snow does not itself in any
degree impair Roy's "freedom to believe, express,
and exercise" his religion. Consequently, [Roy's]
objection ... is without merit. 84
The same reasoning applies to the Speech Clause, which is
phrased in negative terms almost identical to those of the Free Exercise
83. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
84. Id. at 699-701 (alteration added) (citation omitted).
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85Clause. The Court has not suggested that the government has an
affirmative duty to foster speech among its citizens, but only a duty not
86to impair it absent sufficient justification. But the Orwell Act does not
impair the freedom to believe, express, and exercise one's freedom of
speech, at least in the Court's conventional understanding of impairment
as involving some kind of law or regulation outlawing or requiring some
action. The Act, quite simply, requires nothing of citizens and prohibits
nothing pertaining to speech.
This is not to say that it cannot have First Amendment
consequences, however. Two (somewhat overlapping) lines of cases
offer some hope for the Anti-Orwellians: cases involving a "chilling
effect" on the freedom of association, and cases involving a "chilling
effect" on speech generally.
A. Associations on the Rocks
The term "freedom of association" does not appear in the First
Amendment, but it now stands as a "clearly established" constitutional
right. 87  Perhaps fortuitously for Anti-Orwellians, the first case to
"establish" the right to free association, NAACP v. Alabama,88 rested
upon the danger of a chilling effect upon protected freedoms:
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled
disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in
advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on
freedom of association as the forms of
governmental action in the cases above [involving
regulations having a chill upon speech] were
thought likely to produce upon the particular
85. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting the free exercise" of religion nor "abridging the freedom of speech").
86. The exception lies when the government opens a public forum or some
analogous program designed to promote public debate, in which case it must offer
access to the forum on a viewpoint-neutral basis. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 229-236 (2000) (holding that public universities must fund groups on
a viewpoint-neutral basis when they exact general fees for the purpose of funding
expressive student groups).
87. Fisher, supra note 79, at 635.
88. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
260 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 5
THE OR WELLIAN LOOPHOLE
constitutional rights there involved. This Court has
recognized the vital relationship between freedom
to associate and privacy in one's
associations .... Inviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses
dissident beliefs.89
Since that time, the Court has recognized that freedom of
association exists "in two distinct senses": the freedom "to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships" (intimate association),
and the freedom "to associate for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition
for redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion" (expressive
association).90 For the purposes of the Orwell Act, the first category
overlaps in relevant respects with the due-process right to privacy and
warrants no further discussion here.91 The second category, however,
may hold some hope for the Anti-Orwellians.
The second category has evolved to include protection for
expressive groups against forced inclusion of unwanted members and
restrictions upon their ability to disseminate their views, two strands that
hold little weight in challenging the Orwell Act. But, according to one
scholar, "the privacy of the group and its members remains the core of
the right., 92 Unfortunately, if privacy remains the core of associational
rights, the Supreme Court has certainly not treated it as such; it has heard
only one case concerning the surveillance of expressive groups and
dismissed it for lack of standing.93 Indeed, there is a legitimate question
as to whether privacy remains at the heart of freedom of association. The
Supreme Court has not cited NAACP for the proposition that freedom of
association encompasses privacy of association since 1986,94 and it has
not issued a ruling on the basis of a right to private association since
89. Id. at 462 (alteration added) (citation omitted).
90. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
91. See supra Part Ill.
92. Fisher, supra note 79, at 638.
93. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
94. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 215 n.5 (1986).
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1984.95 As for the lower courts, some "have held political surveillance
claims justiciable where the surveillance targeted a particular group or
individual."
9 6
The Orwell Act does not target particular groups or individuals
on its face, nor does it "exclud[e] a person from a profession or punish[]
him solely because he is a member of a particular political organization
or because he holds certain beliefs," 97 which the First Amendment
freedom of association prohibits. On the other hand, the Supreme Court
has not allowed the government to "inquire about an individual's beliefs
and associations"98 for the purpose of giving or withholding a benefit
unless it can show "a substantial relation between the information sought
and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest."99 In addition,
an organization may assert an interest in keeping the confidentiality of its
membership list if the confidentiality is "so related to the right of the
members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to
associate freely with others in so doing as to come within the protection"
of the Constitution'°°-that is, if compelled disclosure "is likely to affect
adversely the ability of [the organization] and its members to pursue their
collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to
advocate."'1
0
The Orwell Act would inevitably reveal information regarding
citizens' expressive associations. With cameras, microphones, and
email, computer, and phone monitoring, it is unlikely that citizens could
hide their associations from the government while still remaining active
members of those groups. The reality of this inevitable disclosure could
provide Anti-Orwellians (or, more specifically, Anti-Orweillian
expressive organizations) with two arguments: first, that the surveillance
amounts to compelled disclosure for the purpose of giving or
95. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) (upholding a
trial court's issuance of a protective order in discovery to protect the identities of
donors to an unconventional spiritual group).
96. Fisher, supra note 79, at 655.
97. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (alterations added).
98. Id.
99. Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
100. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
101. Id. at 462-63 (alteration added).
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withholding benefits, and second, that it "chills" their "collective effort
to foster" beliefs through lawful advocacy.
The first claim is the more dubious of the two. While the
government "inquires into" associations in the sense that they inquire
into all communication through general surveillance, it does not make
this inquiry of associations directly. The government asks no questions;
it merely observes. Under such an expansive reading of NAACP, the
government in that case would have been prohibited from discovering
the identities of the NAACP's members by indirect methods; for
example, if a citizen came to the attorney general's office and said, "My
neighbor told me he is a member of the NAACP," the attorney general
would have to close his ears. Furthermore, NAACP relied at least in part
upon evidence that the disclosed members were subject to private• , 102
reprisals, whereas the Orwell Act does not authorize disclosure to
private individuals and our hypothetical does not envision abuse of this
information by public officials. In addition, the government neither
confers nor withholds benefits on the basis of the Orwell Act, at least in
the traditional sense of economic or employment opportunities. The
surveillance may lead to consequences-the federal government may
increase local surveillance of suspicious people or use data against
suspects in criminal trials-but it is a stretch to consider the freedom
from increased government suspicion a "benefit" that the government
"withholds" as a result of citizens' associational ties.
The second claim holds more promise for Anti-Orwellians in
that constant government surveillance would likely discourage
membership in anti-government organizations.103  Putting aside the
question of whether the government surveillance actually chills
expressive association, the Anti-Orwellians face other difficulties in
establishing a claim under NAACP-namely, that a court could easily
distinguish the NAACP case on its facts. NAACP was a case involving
compelled disclosure of an organization's member list. While citizens
102. Id. at 462-63 (noting that known NAACP members were subject to
private retaliation and stating that "[t]he crucial factor is the interplay of
governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state
power... that private action takes hold") (alteration added).
103. Such surveillance could also discourage expression of anti-government
beliefs generally, and I will address this chilling effect further in the next section on
pure, non-associational free speech.
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are "compelled" to reveal their associations under the Orwell Act in the
sense that the realities of government surveillance make it impossible to
hide them, the Act requires no affirmative disclosure to the government.
It adds no direct relationship between organizations and the government.
In sum, a claim that the Orwell Act violates citizens' rights to
engage in expressive association carries hope in principle, but the claim
may fall short in the details. Case law also suggests that surveillance in
itself does not abridge the right to expressive association unless it
involves targeted surveillance of certain groups. 104 The government's
efforts regarding general surveillance blend into the Anti-Orwellians'
second claim under the First Amendment: that the Orwell Act chills free
speech generally.
B. Speech on the Rocks
1. A Brief Historical Perspective
The history of domestic surveillance in response to citizens'
exercise of their First Amendment rights is not a proud one. It is
divisible into two categories with different degrees of government mens
rea: surveillance of individuals because of their messages themselves,1°5
and surveillance of individuals because their messages suggest that they
may pose a threat to national security given external events. 0 6 The first
category treats speech as harmful in itself, at least to the government in
power, and surveillance in such circumstances constitutes political
espionage. The second category treats speech as a symptom, a
convenient means for criminal profiling based on ideology.
104. See generally Fisher, supra note 79.
105. The Watergate scandal is perhaps the most well-known example of the
past century.
106. This category of surveillance is probably more common than the first, and
is exemplified by modem government technological surveillance such as the FBI's
CARNIVORE program (which scans Internet traffic for patterns and key words or
phrases) and the NSA's alleged ECHELON program (which, according to some
commentators, intercepts global communications and filters them electronically to
assess potential threats to national security). Lawrence D. Sloan, Echelon and the
Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A Need for Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J.
1467, 1470-79 (2001).
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The government's early efforts at widespread domestic
surveillance fell into the profiling category. Following an outbreak of
terrorist bombings in 1919, the FBI created "[d]ossiers detailing the
political beliefs of [communists] and other radicals" and arrested
thousands of them in the 1920 "Palmer Raids. 1 °7  These efforts
continued to concentrate on suspected communists (as well as fascists
and other extremists) immediately prior to World War II, and
communists remained a point of focus through the first thirty years of the
Cold War. 10 Surveillance of those of Middle Eastern descent in the days
following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 certainly belongs in this category.
After World War II, the government also began surveillance in
the political espionage category: "FBI investigations covered 'the entire
spectrum of the social and labor movement in the country,"' all for "pure
intelligence" purposes. 10 9 The FBI's investigation of Martin Luther
King, Jr. offers the most infamous example of this type of surveillance.1 0
In these cases, the FBI did more than just keep a watchful eye on
dissidents: it infiltrated dissident groups, sent "poison-pen letters
intended to break up marriages," "encourag[ed] gang warfare," and
operated "on the theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups
and the propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the national
security and deter violence."'11
Amid this history of nationwide efforts at surveillance, Anti-
Orwellians cannot help but feel dismay at the relatively small number of
free-speech cases addressing the issue of government surveillance. The
Supreme Court has heard only one First Amendment challenge to a
systematic government surveillance program, and it dismissed the case
for lack of standing.112 Justice Thurgood Marshall, sitting as Circuit
Justice, heard one case addressing surveillance at one specific event, and
107. Fisher, supra note 79, at 629 (alterations added).
108. Seeid. at 630-31.
109. Id. at 630 (quoting SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-
775, 94TH CONG., 2d Sess., Book III, at 449 (1976) [hereinafter "Intelligence
Report"] available at http://www.cointel.org).
110. ld. at 631.
111. Id. (citing Intelligence Report, Book III, at 3 (alteration added)).
112. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
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he ruled for the government on the merits. 1 3 Lower courts have rarely
dealt with the issue since those two Supreme Court rulings in the early
1970s, and few cases reached the merits.' 14 This could, of course, be
attributed to a reduction in government domestic surveillance following
the Watergate scandal. But domestic surveillance increased following
the terrorist attacks of 9/11; since that time, federal courts have heard
only a handful of cases alleging that federal government surveillance
created a "chilling effect" on speech.
15
This discouraging history may result from the nature of
surveillance itself, in that subjects may not know they are under
surveillance and thus have no motivation to seek an injunction to stop it.
But it may also result from the tallest pretrial hurdle for "chilling effect"
cases: standing. Even if the Anti-Orwellians can meet these standing
requirements, the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny remains.
2. Standing, and Falling
Under traditional standing requirements, the Court requires that
plaintiffs show (1) "injury in fact"--that is, a "concrete and
particularized" legal harm that is "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural'
or 'hypothetical'-that (2) arises from "the challenged action of the
defendant" and (3) is "likely" to be "redressed by a favorable
decision. ' 16 In chilling-effect cases, the first two requirements are the
sticking points: chilling-effect harms are difficult to prove, and even if
they exist, a court may decide that they arise not from actions of the
defendant, but from "speculative apprehensiveness" that amounts to a
"subjective 'chill."" 117
113. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1320 (1974).
114. Eric Lardiere, Comment, The Justiciability and Constitutionality of
Political Intelligence Gathering, 30 UCLA L. REv. 976, 993 (1983).
115. See ACLU v. Nat'l. Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006);
Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2005); Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.
Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006); Elnashar v.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. 03-5110, 2004 WL 2237059 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2004),
aff'd, 446 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2006); AI-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d. 13
(D.D.C. 2003).
116. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations
omitted).
117. Laird, 408 U.S. at 13.
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In addition, "chilling-effect" claims carry an inherent
contradiction that works against standing. When plaintiffs claim that
government action "chills" their speech, they essentially claim that they
lack the courage to speak out against the government because they fear
negative repercussions. Yet the very act of bringing a public lawsuit
against the government is an act of courage in defiance of those
repercussions; if a harm truly existed, if these plaintiffs were truly
"chilled," then they would not have brought suit in the first place.
Further, the Supreme Court has refused to give plaintiffs in chilling-
effect cases the ability to assert standing on behalf of less-courageous
non-parties to a lawsuit: "if [the plaintiffs] themselves are not chilled, but
seek only to represent those 'millions' whom they believe are so chilled,
[they] clearly lack that 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'
essential to standing."' 18
Even if the Anti-Orwellians could overcome this inherent
difficulty, the challenge of showing a concrete and particularized chill
remains. The likelihood of success in this element may depend upon the
nature of repercussions for certain speech. Obviously, the more concrete
the deterrent against lawful speech, the more concrete the chill in the
eyes of the Court.
i. "Mere" Surveillance
In Laird v. Tatum,'19 the Supreme Court addressed government
surveillance of dissident groups with the stated purpose of
"collect[ing] ... information about public activities that were thought to
have at least some potential for civil disorder. '' 12 Several protesters
brought a class action to enjoin the government from conducting such
surveillance, arguing that it chilled their lawful speech. Unlike prior
chilling-effect cases, the surveillance program was not "regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory in nature"; 2 the plaintiffs were challenging
the "mere existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and
118. Id. at 13 n.7 (alterations added) (citation omitted).
119. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
120. Id. at 6 (alteration added).
121. Id. at 11.
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data-gathering activity. 1 22 The Court dismissed their claim for lack of
standing, holding that "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an
adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a
threat of specific future harm.' 23
The Laird requirements apparently render "mere surveillance"
automatically inadequate to create standing. But Socialist Workers Party
v. Attorney General,124 decided just two years after Laird, suggests
otherwise. Justice Marshall, sitting alone as Circuit Justice, reviewed the
grant of a preliminary injunction requiring the government to cease its
efforts to conduct surveillance of a Socialist gathering. Marshall made a
dubious distinction between that case and Laird, ruling that "the Court
was merely distinguishing earlier cases, not setting out a rule for
determining whether an action is justiciable or not" when it found that
the surveillance at issue was not "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
in nature."1 25 He asserted that the key issue in Laird was simply the
plaintiffs' failure to assert any chill at all beyond a fear of future misuse
of information by the government. 126 In the case at hand, however, the
plaintiffs did assert a specific chill-that some Socialists would stay
home rather than attend the meeting if the government watched it, thus
causing injury to all members of the group regardless of whether or not
each member felt an actual chill.
27
Under this reasoning, the fatal mistake of the plaintiffs in Laird
was their failure to specify some future gathering or protest where
government surveillance would cause potential attendees to stay home.1
28
Marshall may have simply transferred the harshness of the Laird chill
requirements from the standing portion of the case to the merits: he ruled
that the Socialists were unlikely to succeed on the merits, claiming that
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 13-14 (alteration added).
124. 419 U.S. 1314 (1974).
125. Id. at 1318 (citation omitted).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 1319.
128. Cf ACLU v. Nat'l. Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 769 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (finding standing to allege a chilling effect when the plaintiffs-newspaper
reporters-asserted a "concrete profession-related injur[y]" in that sources refused to
speak with them over the telephone due to known government wiretapping)
(alteration added).
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the balance of the "competing interests" weighed in favor of the
government, and he struck down the injunction. 2 1
Despite Justice Marshall's lenient application of precedent
regarding standing, Laird remains the Supreme Court's only en banc
ruling to address the issue of standing in mere surveillance cases. If the
Court in the future rejects Justice Marshall's interpretation of Laird as
simply distorting the holding beyond recognition, then standing poses a
major problem in mere surveillance cases. First, plaintiffs must show an
actual chill. Second, they must show that the government, rather than the
plaintiffs' own minds, causes the chill; that is, they must show an
objective chill, rather than a subjective one.
Showing an actual, measurable chill from mere surveillance has
its practical difficulties. If there truly is a chilling effect from such a vast
system of unavoidable surveillance, then few people would feel secure in
coming forward to challenge it. Even if the Anti-Orwellians could find
such plaintiffs, the question remains: does surveillance, without more,
actually keep people from talking freely?
The Orwell Act's namesake certainly believed that was the case,
and other scholars concur. British philosopher Jeremy Bentham
described the power of "mere surveillance" in his 1787 work,
"Panopticon,"130 in which he envisioned a prison with cells forming a
circle around a guard tower.13 1 Each cell has a window facing the guard
tower to eliminate privacy; furthermore, the lighting arrangement makes
it impossible for prisoners to see when guards are watching them and
when they are not. The result, according to modem philosopher
Michel Foucault, is total control over the inmates without physical
coercion:
A real subjection is bom mechanically from a
fictitious relation .... He who is subjected to a
field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes
responsibility for the constraints of power; he
makes them spontaneously upon himself; he
129. Socialist Workers Party, 419 U.S. at 1319.
130. BENTHAM, supra note 7, at 29-95.
131. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975).
132. Id. at 200-01.
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inscribes in himself the power relation in which he
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the
principle of his own subjection. By this very fact,
the external power may throw off its physical
weight; it tends to the non-corporal; and, the more
it approaches this limit, the more constant,
profound and permanent are its effects: it is a
perpetual victory that avoids any physical
confrontation and which is always decided in
advance. 133
These philosophers recognized that the loss of subjective privacy
conditions the human mind toward submission, and unpredictable
surveillance can be just as effective in controlling human behavior as
visible locks and chains.
In the year following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, scholars founded
the peer-reviewed journal Surveillance and Society for the purpose of
exploring the "rapidly developing field of analysis and theory" it calls
"surveillance studies. '  While the growth of this field of academic
exploration offers Anti-Orwellians some hope of using empirical studies
to prove a chill, those studies today remain scarce. But common sense
informs us that we adapt our speech to our audience. Just as many
people would hesitate to curse in front of their young children, people
may feel uneasy engaging in dissident speech within earshot of the
State's law-enforcement authorities-particularly when the State knows
the identity of the potential speaker, and that speaker does not enjoy the
crowd support present in a rally or protest. But the Orwell Act does even
more: even if the government conducts "mere surveillance," the implicit
133. Id. at 202-03.
134. See David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: Understanding Visibility, Mobility,
and the Phenetic Fix, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC'Y 1, 1 (2002).
135. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Julia C. Walker, Societal Expectations of
Privacy: The Courts Struggle to Identify What Activities Constitute a Search,
MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Apr. 2002, available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr02/j
n.html ("A fertile area for future research will be to examine additional factors that
may influence expectations of privacy."). The authors encourage further research in
this area: "Whether, and in what ways, expectations of privacy change in response to
technological developments . . . are interesting questions to be pursued." Id.
(alteration added).
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threat of later disclosure may cause speakers to limit their speech to those
words that would not embarrass them should their conversations become
public. In this respect, we might restrict our cursing not only in the
presence of our children or other people for whom such language would
be inappropriate, but at all times, because the presence of a recorded
copy of those words carries the implicit possibility of future disclosure.
Political-process sunshine laws and campaign-financing
disclosures operate on this same principle: if politicians know their
actions may be open to public examination, they are less likely to engage
in unethical behavior that others may easily uncover as a result of the
laws. Of course, these laws are imperfect with regard to shaping
politicians' behavior towards greater integrity. Because the laws do not
open all political transactions and communications to the public eye,
politicians may still make corrupt deals behind closed doors. The Orwell
Act, on the other hand, may be a perfect law with regard to shaping
behavior away from criminal activity. After all, if the Orwell Act makes
criminal communication impossible everywhere, it may effectively
eliminate such speech and perhaps crime altogether.
But the impact of surveillance is not limited to deterrence of
criminal activity. Researchers have noted the impact of surveillance
since at least 1897, when Norman Triplett found that the sheer presence
of fellow riders caused bicyclists to pedal faster than when they rode
alone; 136 in other words, the known presence and observation of others
caused a shift in behavior toward what that particular group of observers
might find appropriate or impressive. In a 1965 survey of studies on the
impact of surveillance, Robert Zajonc noted that "[t]he presence of
others may provide cues as to appropriate or inappropriate responses. 137
The works of both scholars suggest the possibility that people under
known government surveillance may subconsciously tailor their behavior
to ensure its suitability for government observation.
Of course, both of these scholars examined face-to-face
surveillance, encompassing a kind of interaction between the watcher
and the watched that is not present in the Orwell Act. The government
136. Norman Triplett, The Dynamogic Factors in Pacemaking and
Competition, 9 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 507, 533 (1898).
137. Robert B. Zajonc, Social Facilitation, 149 SCIENCE 269, 274 (1965)
(alteration added).
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may argue that people do not actually change their behaviors in response
to known passive surveillance. An examination of Internet behavior is a
prime example. Despite well-publicized information regarding the lack
of online privacy, "69 million Americans go online each day and engage
in various activities," including activities they would be ashamed to do inSx138
public (such as viewing pornography). Thus, "[p]eople seem to be
of... two minds .... They worry about the possibility of monitoring,
but then they dismiss the concerns and proceed without thinking about
it. ' ' 139 Current online behavior in the face of potential passive
surveillance may be distinguishable from expected behavior under the
Orwell Act: a publicized nationwide surveillance effort by the
government would certainly foster a greater public perception of
immediate and certain non-privacy than today's scattered news reports
regarding the non-privacy of the Internet. But, over time, even this
perception may fade due to the ubiquity of the surveillance. Just like the
numb citizens of Orwell's 1984, people may change their behavior,
actions, and thoughts without realizing it, because surveillance would
become a constant, a part of life no different than breathing. The
definitions of "privacy" and "chill" might subtly change, as well, and
thus people (including justices on the Supreme Court) may question
whether their behaviors in the face of surveillance had shifted at all.
Even if the Anti-Orwellians could prove a chill, Laird suggests
that they must still prove that the chill results from government
surveillance rather than their own minds-in other words, they must
prove that they are not the "principle[s] of [their] own subjection. 140 In
a system in which surveillance carries no concrete consequences for
lawful activity, this demand may prove too much. While the government
surveillance would certainly be the "but-for" cause of the chill, the Court
may find that the chill does not result from any reasonable fear of future,
concrete harm. It could hold that this fear instead results from the
demons of the Anti-Orwellians' own minds, and that the irrational
paranoia that creates a chill for some people cannot justify overturning
an act of Congress that protects all people.
138. Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REv. 9, 10 n.6 (2004).
139. Id. at 76 (citations omitted) (alteration added).
140. FOUCAULT, supra note 131, at 203 (alterations added).
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ii. Surveillance with the Threat ofAdmission in Criminal Trials and
Increased Attention from Law Enforcement Officials
Cases alleging a chill based on the threat that prosecutors may
admit recorded conversations in criminal trials have not reached the
Court since Katz required warrants for wiretaps.' 4' The danger of
increased attention from law enforcement based on the interception of
"suspicious" activity or communications became the subject of First
Amendment challenges in ACLU v. National Security Agency,14 2 a case
before the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
and Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press v. American Telephone
& Telegraph Co.,14 3 a case before the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. In Reporters Committee, journalists sought an injunction to
stop a government practice of asking for and obtaining phone call
records from telephone companies based on both the First and Fourth
Amendments, with First Amendment claims for both the public generally
and reporters specifically. Their First Amendment claim was essentially
that of a chilling effect: they argued that "if journalists were compelled to
identify their sources, informants would refuse to furnish information in
the future, and... this would interfere with the free flow of information
protected by the First Amendment."'"
The court rejected the plaintiffs' claims in no uncertain terms,
and its discussion of a First Amendment challenge against official
investigation bodes ill for Anti-Orwellians. It ruled that the First
Amendment gives no one the right to "immunize themselves from good
faith investigation"'145 and that the "[First] Amendment guarantees no
freedom from such investigation."' 146 It also read Laird as requiring any
chilling effect to arise from "the present or future exercise, or threatened
exercise, of coercive power. '14 7 Then, in a statement that would destroy
the Anti-Orwellians' hope of success in this claim, the court addressed
141. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Katz decision and the subsequent
crumbling of its foundational principles).
142. 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
143. 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
144. Id. at 1049-50.
145. Id. at 1051.
146. Id. at 1052 (alteration added).
147. Id.
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the relationship between Fourth and Fifth Amendment investigative
limits and First Amendment limitations on chilling free speech:
To the extent an individual insists that he must
shield himself from the prospect of good faith
investigation and operate in secrecy in order to
exercise effectively particular First Amendment
liberties, he must find that shield and establish that
secrecy within the framework of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections. This is not to say that the
First Amendment never gives rise to any privacy-
type interests apart from those secured by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It does mean,
however, that such interests are overridden in
criminal cases by the public's interest in effective
law enforcement investigation at least insofar as
they go beyond protections already afforded by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
1 48
Thus, under Reporters Committee, allegations of chill based on
fear of future or present criminal investigation depend entirely upon the
constitutionality of the investigation itself. If the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments do not protect the speaker, neither does the First.
Most recent cases involving government surveillance connected
to the "War on Terrorism" appear to adopt the Reporters Committee
approach. In Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 149 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that post-9/11 provisions allowing for
monitoring of attorney-client communications did not give a suspect
standing for asserting a "chilling effect." 5° The District of Minnesota
took a similar stance in Elnashar v. US. Department of Justice."5' In
that case, the FBI received a tip regarding Elnashar's suspicious speech
and initiated an investigation. 52 The district court threw out his claim of
a chilling effect, noting that Elnashar "alleges at most that he is
148. Id. at 1054.
149. 279 F. Supp. 2d. 13 (D.D.C. 2003).
150. Id. at 28.
151. No. 03-5110, 2004 WL 2237059 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2004), aff'd, 446
F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2006).
152. Id. at *7.
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aggrieved by the threat of 'future secret actions' by the FBI and the
DOJ."
153
ACLU is the only district court case since 9/11 to rule that
government surveillance did give rise to a First Amendment violation,
and unlike Reporters' Committee, it did not specifically require a finding
of a Fourth Amendment violation in order to find First Amendment
standing. But neither is it necessarily inconsistent with the Reporters
Committee approach. The district court found a violation of the First
Amendment only after holding that the government had violated the
Fourth Amendment, and those violations were linked: "The President of
the United States . . . has undisputedly violated the Fourth
[Amendment] . . . and accordingly has violated the First Amendment
[r]ights of these Plaintiffs as well. ' 154 Thus, it may have merely moved
the Reporters Committee analysis to linking Fourth Amendment
violations to the merits of a First Amendment claim, rather than the
standing to bring it.
In short, provided the government does not inform citizens of
what types of speech, profession, nationality, etc., will bring increased
surveillance, case law treats the threat of future surveillance no
differently than mere surveillance. This makes some sense: after all, if
citizens do not know exactly what types of speech will bring future
attention, or what that future attention will look like, then their claim
remains just as speculative as when the government asserts that it will
not take any action at all.
A different case would exist, however, if the government was
more forthright with its use of Orwell-Act information. In Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,1 55 the Court found that the actions of the "Rhode
Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth" were
unconstitutional violations of the First Amendment. The Commission,
which was a creation of the Rhode Island state legislature, reviewed
literature and notified local book and magazine distributors of materials
it found "objectionable for sale, distribution, or display to youths under
153. Id. at *8.
154. ACLU v. Nat'l. Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 776 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (alterations added).
155. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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18 years of age."'156 Its notification went beyond mere suggestion: it
thanked distributors for their cooperation and reminded them of Rhode
Island obscenity laws. 157 Book distributors took these notices seriously,
and one bookseller testified that he returned the objectionable books to
publishers because he wanted to "avoid becoming involved in a 'court
proceeding' with a 'duly authorized organization."",158 The Court found
that the mere suggested threat of future action, in this case, was enough
to create standing and invalidate the Commission's actions:
It is true that appellants' books have not been
seized or banned by the State, and that no one has
been prosecuted for their possession or sale. But
though the Commission is limited to informal
sanctions-the threat of invoking legal sanctions
and other means of coercion, persuasion, and
intimidation-the record amply demonstrates that
the Commission deliberately set about to achieve
the suppression of publications deemed
"objectionable" and succeeded in its aim. 59
While the case seems to give the Anti-Orwellians a solid ground
for a challenge based upon threat of future action, the facts of the case
pose problems due to the language of the Orwell Act. First, the Court in
Bantam Books did not look at the distributors' standing to challenge the
Commission's activities, but rather the standing of the book publishers
who were harmed by their inability to find distributors in Rhode
Island.160  Second, the Court did not rule that the notices themselves
created a chill that would give the distributors standing to challenge the
suit. Instead, the Court looked to the Commission's surveillance and
threats of future actions as indicative of the true purpose of the actions:
to effectively suppress objectionable publications. 161
Anti-Orwellians can make no similar argument regarding the
Orwell Act. Congress did not pass the Act to suppress speech, but to
156. Id. at 61.
157. Id. at 62.
158. Id. at 63.
159. Id. at 66-67.
160. Id. at 61.
161. Id. at 72.
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monitor it in an effort to detect future terrorist attacks. The Act may
have the purpose of deterring terrorism, but terrorism and dissident
speech are different animals under the Constitution. The Orwell Act
does not seem to present a case of political-espionage surveillance (in
which the government seeks to deter the speech of those opposed to its
policies), and thus any threats of future action relate to the suppression of
terrorism, not the suppression of dissident speech.'62
iii. Standing be Damned. The Overbreath Doctrine
Given the above difficulties with regard to standing, the Anti-
Orwellians could attempt to circumvent the standing requirement by
application of the overbreadth doctrine. To strike down a law on the
basis of overbreadth, the Court need not have a plaintiff before it who
meets the traditional requirements for standing.163 When plaintiffs allege
that a statute is overbroad and thus in violation of the First Amendment,
they need only show that the "threat of enforcement of an overbroad law
may deter or 'chill' constitutionally protected speech--especially when
the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions,"' 164 and that such a law
punishes a "'substantial' amount of protected free speech, 'judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.""
65
At first glance, this doctrine appears promising. The Orwell Act
is absolutely overbroad within the common meaning of the term; its
technology captures all constitutionally-protected speech, regardless of
whether that speech implicates national security concerns. Once again,
however, the non-prohibitive nature of the Orwell Act stands in the way
of a strong challenge. In the Court's traditional overbreadth
162. This distinction may falter if the government decides to publish its criteria
for determining when speech warrants suspicion or to notify suspects when their
speech warrants government attention. These actions would contradict the
government's alleged purpose of the Orwell Act; after all, if the government truly
sought to investigate potential terrorists, it would serve no purpose to forewarn those
suspects about how to avoid attention or alert them once that attention arrives. Thus,
so long as the government hides its methods for filtering the information and
designating certain speech as suspicious, the Anti-Orwellians may have difficulty
overcoming the standing requirement.
163. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
164. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).
165. Id. at 118-19 (quotingBroadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
2007] THE OR WELLIAN LOOPHOLE 277
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
jurisprudence, plaintiffs challenge some criminal or regulatory
proscription that leaves open the possibility that it will ban or chill a
substantial amount of lawful First Amendment activity.1 66 Because the
Act imposes no penalties for behavior that might include legitimate First
Amendment expression, 167 the Court is unlikely to administer the "strong
medicine" 168 of the overbreadth doctrine.
3. Level of Scrutiny
If the Anti-Orwellians can show standing, the determination of
what level of judicial scrutiny to apply to the Act may decide its
constitutionality. The surveillance itself is clearly both viewpoint- and
content-neutral, in that it monitors all communications without
exception. Thus, the government would argue that the law merely
regulates the manner of speech; that is, it requires any speech to be made
in a manner observable by the government. Such time, place, and/or
manner restrictions receive intermediate scrutiny, as defined by United
States v. 0 'Brien: 69
166. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574-
76 (1987) (holding that a directive banning "all First Amendment activities" in a Los
Angeles airport terminal to be unconstitutionally overbroad); Schad v. Mt. Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 72 (1981) (holding an ordinance banning all live entertainment within a
municipality to be unconstitutionally overbroad because the municipality had "not
adequately justified its substantial restriction of protected activity").
167. The Orwell Act does penalize any tampering with the tools of
surveillance, and Anti-Orwellians could make an argument that this penalty chills
legitimate free speech. This argument is weak for two reasons. First, the Court has
already ruled that the destruction of governmental or government-issued property is
not protected speech in and of itself when "Congress has a legitimate and substantial
interest in preventing [its] wanton and unrestrained destruction" and the prohibition
is narrowly tailored to serve that purpose. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
380, 382 (1968) (alteration added). In our hypothetical, there is no indication that
the penalty for tampering or destroying these devices is broader than necessary to
protect them. Second, any purported chill upon protected speech as a result of the
anti-tampering provisions is circular in that it is premised upon the illegitimacy of
the surveillance program in the first place; it is not the anti-tampering provisions
specifically that chill speech, but rather the existence of such devices at all.
168. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
169. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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[A] regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
70
Later cases added a further requirement, originally given in
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion to O'Brien: the restriction may not
"ha[ve] the effect of entirely preventing a 'speaker' from reaching a
significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully
communicate." 7 1  In other words, the restrictions must "leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information."
7 1
Under that test, the Orwell Act stands a mild chance of survival,
particularly if the existence of a chilling effect is a close issue for the
Court. Certainly, the government has the constitutional authority to
defend against terrorist attacks, and the prevention of violence is the
utmost government interest. The issue lies in the narrow tailoring
requirement: whether the Act's suspicionless surveillance program chills
far more speech than is necessary to prevent terrorism and whether a
suspicion-based surveillance program accomplishes the same task with
170. Id. at 377 (alteration added). Although O'Brien concerned speech in a
public forum, the Court has also applied intermediate scrutiny (in some form) to
restrictions upon speech on privately-owned property. See City of Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (stating that a "zoning restriction that is
designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to
intermediate ... scrutiny") (Kennedy, J., concurring); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512
U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994) (striking down a city ordinance banning residential signs
because it did not leave alternative channels for communication, an element of the
intermediate scrutiny test; also noting that "more temperate measures" could be
constitutional). Although the Court applies intermediate scrutiny to such
regulations, it sometimes takes account for the fact that the speech takes place upon
private property by finding a lower government interest than such regulations upon
speech on public property. See id. at 58.
171. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring) (alteration
added).
172. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984).
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less of a chilling effect. Unfortunately for Anti-Orwellians, the O'Brien
test does not require the "least restrictive . . . means."' 73 Even if it did,
the government may argue that terrorism is a latent threat, whose
practitioners by nature conceal their plans until immediately before the
moment of action, and thus a suspicion-based system cannot effectively
handle the problem.
In this situation, the Anti-Orwellians would argue for strict
scrutiny because the repercussions of the general surveillance-an
increase in particular surveillance-arise out of the government's
content- and viewpoint-based distinctions between different kinds of
speech. Even if the Court found that increased attention from law-
enforcement authorities based on the content or viewpoint of the speech
might warrant strict scrutiny, however, the government may make one
further counterargument based on free-speech zoning cases. It could
argue that its content and/or viewpoint distinctions are the result of
"profiling" surveillance, and the justification for it is akin to the
justification for zoning laws that restrict movie theaters and bookstores
from selling sexually explicit materials in certain areas of a city. 174 In the
zoning cases, the speech itself was lawful and the government could not
ban it, but the "secondary effects" of this speech were negative and fell
within the government's power to regulate. 175  Therefore, the Court
ruled, the government may regulate the location of sexually explicit
expression under intermediate scrutiny so long as it does not "effectively
deny[] . . . a reasonable opportunity" to engage in the speech. 76
Similarly, under the Orwell Act, the government could argue that it may
listen to communications-constructively "zoning" all communications
as open to government ears-in an effort to anticipate and prevent
adverse secondary effects of those communications (the execution of
terrorist acts that require such communications).
173. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
174. See, e.g., Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448-49 (reversing a grant of
summary judgment against a city's zoning ordinance restricting the locations where
businesses offering sexually explicit materials could operate); Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (upholding a city's zoning ordinance
restricting the locations where such businesses could operate).
175. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448.
176. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54 (alteration added).
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Profiling surveillance does carry some distinguishable features,
some calling for greater scrutiny than "secondary effects" cases and
some calling for lesser. The speech at issue in profiling surveillance is
generally political, and thus warrants the highest protection under the
First Amendment. Sexually explicit expression falls within the First
Amendment, but unlike political speech, "few of us would march our
sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see
'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice."'
177
Yet the fact that political speech is somewhat more worthy of First
Amendment protection than sexually explicit speech does not wholly
distinguish the cases. Both types of speech warrant the same general
analysis under the First Amendment, and any distinction based on the
value of the speech should be offset by the fact that the regulations at
issue in the pornography zoning cases are far more restrictive of speech
than mere surveillance. Indeed, the zoning cases actually outlaw the use
of buildings for presentations of some speech outside certain specified
locations, whereas surveillance carries no direct limitation on speech.
Thus, two arguments support the application of intermediate,
rather than strict, scrutiny. The Supreme Court could find that the
Orwell Act's incidental impact on speech is "not substantially broader
than necessary" to meet the urgent need of public safety because
intermediate scrutiny does not demand the "least restrictive means" of
achieving the purpose of the legislation. 7 8 Therefore, the Court could
uphold its constitutionality. The First Amendment fails to close the
loophole, and Anti-Orwellians strike out again.
V. CLAIM No. 4: AMALGAMATED CLAIMS
While none of these individual claims may be sufficient to strike
down the Orwell Act, the existence of overlapping constitutional claims
may strengthen the claim as a whole. The Court suggested this
possibility in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
177. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion).
178. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 ("So long as the means chosen are not
substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, however,
the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the
government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive
alternative.").
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Oregon v. Smith. 179  The majority distinguished prior precedent in
striking down a defendant's claim that the State violated the Free
Exercise Clause: "The only decisions in which we have held that the
First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law
to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections." 180 The implication, at least for Free Exercise
claims, is that multiple claims increase the likelihood of success even if
such claims by themselves would not be adequate.
While the Court has not extended this dictum outright, it applied
this principle to a similar situation in Stanley v. Georgia.181 Stanley had
been arrested for possessing obscene materials in his home. Stanley
could not make a free-speech claim alone, because obscenity does not
receive First Amendment protection. 82 Nor could he make a pure Fourth
Amendment or right-to-privacy claim: the police entered Stanley's home
pursuant to a search warrant for bookmaking, and they did not exceed the
scope of the warrant in their search.183 But his asserted right to read and
watch obscene materials in the privacy of his own home implicated the
justifications of both rights and created a whole constitutional challenge
that was greater than the sum of its parts:
This right to receive information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth ... is fundamental
to our free society. Moreover, in the context of this
case-a prosecution for mere possession of printed
or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own
home-that right takes on an added dimension.
For also fundamental is the right to be free, except
in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy. 1
4
179. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
180. Id. at 881.
181. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
182. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
183. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558.
184. Id. at 564. The Court cited Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948), to support the idea that the relative "social worth" of the information at issue
does not effect the analysis.
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The Orwell Act is a strong candidate for this kind of
"amalgamated" claim. The Anti-Orwellians may lose a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the Act-but the issue would be close. The
Anti-Orwellians may lose a Fifth Amendment challenge to the Act-but
the issue would be close. The Anti-Orwellians may lose First
Amendment challenges asserting their rights to expressive association
and freedom of speech-but the issues would be close. If the Court
views the claims collectively rather than taking a "divide and conquer"
approach, it may face difficulty upholding the Act. The Act may not
violate the technical prohibitions of these three amendments, but it
certainly violates the spirit of each of them. In this situation, the Court
may take a stand against this totalitarian measure and preserve the liberty
the Framers sought to guarantee. 1
85
But such hopes require a serious leap of faith for Anti-
Orwellians, particularly in an atmosphere of fear in the wake of another
devastating terrorist attack. Judges are human and may reasonably fear
personal guilt and public accountability if more innocent civilians lose
their lives. Thus, while the amalgamated claim could be stronger than
each separate claim, it would still leave much discretion to the Court to
hold the Act constitutional. To protect us from the Orwell Act, we need
more than mere trust in the detached wisdom of the judiciary; we need a
new category of First Amendment protection that lends clarity,
predictability, and minimal judicial discretion to claims of suspicionless
surveillance.
185. The district court in ACLU v. Nat'l. Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754
(E.D. Mich. 2006), may have implicitly used this type of reasoning. The court there
struck down NSA wiretapping on First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and
separation-of-powers grounds. Id. at 773-79. The analysis, particularly with regard
to the First and Fourth Amendments, is conclusory and light on citations to any
precedent after 1972. See id. at 773-76 (finding that the program is "obviously in
violation of the Fourth Amendment" and "accordingly has violated the First
Amendment" with little extended explanation beyond including long block-
quotations from older cases). As such, the court may have been attempting to close
the Orwellian Loophole through the unstated amalgamation of the plaintiffs' claims
in a situation where no single constitutional provision squarely addresses them.
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VI. FASHIONING A NEW FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM
A. The First Amendment as a Proper Home for Strong Protection
George Orwell's nightmarish vision was the antithesis of
freedom, showing the danger that people may "become soulless
automatons, and will not even be aware of it.' 86 America, the self-
proclaimed "land of the free," has not yet adopted surveillance on an
Orwellian scale. But the fact that our Constitution, as interpreted by the
courts, might tolerate such a program challenges the very notion of
freedom in America. If this Orwellian Loophole remains, if the
Constitution does not protect us from such measures, then how
committed is our nation to the ideals of liberty? And how tenuous is the
freedom that we currently enjoy?
Many options exist to close this loophole, from tightening Fourth
Amendment constraints to expanding the right to privacy to reviving the
Ninth Amendment. 18  But freedom of speech was Orwell's primary
concern, and, chilling-effect cases notwithstanding, "[w]e believe there is
something special about free speech." 188 If our Constitution is to carry
strong protection against Big Brother, the First Amendment seems an
appropriate place to keep it secure.
186. Erich Fromm, Afterword to ORWELL, supra note 1, at 257.
187. The Ninth Amendment provides that "enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. It is possible to read the above language as
merely stating the truism that citizens retain those rights they did not surrender with
the ratification of the Constitution. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529-
30 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). It is also possible, however, to read that language
as creating the implication that there are other rights, unstated in the Constitution,
which are equally worthy of constitutional protection. See id. at 486-99 (Goldberg,
J., concurring). See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth
Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005) (arguing that, prior to the New Deal, the
Ninth Amendment played a significant role in protecting individual freedom and
limiting federal power).
188. FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 6
(1982) (alteration added).
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B. Past and Proposed Possibilities
1. The Right to Speak Anonymously
What kind of a right would be broad enough to encompass the
Orwell Act's most dangerous measures, but narrow enough to avoid
withering through abstraction? The Supreme Court suggests one
solution in a handful of cases construing a First Amendment right to
speak anonymously. In Talley v. California,189 the Court struck down a
Los Angeles ordinance requiring all handbills to bear the name of the
person responsible for writing or distributing them. The Court examined
the history of anonymous pamphleteering by oppressed groups before
declaring that "identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly
peaceful discussions of public matters of importance."'' 90  The Court
reaffirmed this principle in a more recent case, noting that "[a]nonymity
is a shield from the tyranny of the majority"'191 and holding that a state
abridged a pampleteer's "right to remain anonymous"' 92 or "right to
publish anonymously"' 193 by punishing her for distributing an anonymous
pamphlet.
These "right-to-anonymity" cases do not go far enough for Anti-
Orwellian hopes, however. Such cases tend to utilize a "marketplace of
ideas" rationale for free speech, as evidenced by the Court's reliance on
the importance of anonymous pamphleteering throughout history. While
the Orwell Act certainly harms the marketplace of ideas in its chilling
effect on certain types of speech, it does much more. It invades the
realm of purely private speech, such as musings in a diary or essay that
will never come before the eyes of another and thus never reach the
marketplace of ideas. It also invades speech that is purely emotive,
devoid of ideas in the traditional sense. The government may already
keep watch over much of the speech that enters the marketplace of ideas;
indeed, even anonymous pamphleteers evince no intent to keep the
contents of their speech from the government, only their identity.
189. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
190. Id. at 65..
191. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(alteration added).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 362.
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In addition, the "right-to-anonymity" cases involve government
attempts to coerce disclosure of a speaker's identity, and the speakers in
those cases preferred to remain anonymous for fear of extralegal (as
opposed to law-enforcement) reprisal. In Bates v. City of Little Rock, 94
for example, the NAACP sought to keep its membership lists
confidential because members carried a collective "fear of community
hostility and economic reprisals that would follow public disclosure" as
195
required by the government. The Orwell Act, in contrast, involves no
forced disclosure and no sharing of a speaker's identity with the larger
community. The government merely discovers the identity by its
independent efforts, and it does not share that identity with private
parties. Speakers would not be ostracized by the community; they may
only face secret surveillance by government agents.
Finally, the right to anonymous speech can cover only so much,
for the simple fact that almost all everyday speech is not anonymous, nor
is it intended to be. Restaurant patrons discussing politics, friends
catching up on the latest events, spouses declaring their love for each
other-none of this speech is anonymous, yet none of the speakers wish
to include government listeners in their conversations.
2. Freedom From Overbroad Governmental Information Gathering
Professor Daniel Solove suggests another approach for those
cases in which plaintiffs cannot prove a chilling effect, yet they are
unquestionably subject to large-scale government surveillance.196  In
such situations, Solove argues that courts should borrow from Fourth
Amendment requirements of "particularity" for search warrants, as well
as First Amendment requirements against overly broad subpoenas, to
fashion a new First Amendment right: a right against information-
gathering programs that are not narrowly tailored to fit the government's
interest.197 In essence, Solove calls for intermediate scrutiny of far-
reaching surveillance activities, and demands Fourth-Amendment
194. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
195. Id. at 524.
196. Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with author).
197. Id. at Part IV.A.2 (manuscript at 38-41).
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procedural requirements such as warrants and probable cause for such
information-gathering activities unless the government can show a
compelling reason why these requirements should not apply. 98
While this approach is a novel way to tackle the Orwellian
Loophole, and it would not require a radical rethinking of the First and
Fourth Amendments, it also carries some of the weaknesses of more
traditional approaches. First, the efforts to forge this new right as mere
extensions of provisions relating to the warrant requirement and
protections against overbreadth with regard to subpoenas rest on tenuous
grounds. The Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement for
warrants remains fairly strong,199 but the number of cases to which the
200
warrant requirement itself applies is shrinking. In addition, the
Supreme Court has rarely heard First Amendment claims with regard to
subpoenas, and it has never ruled that the First Amendment alone
outweighs the public interest in information-gathering via the subpoena
power. Courts may be hesitant to draft a new right on the basis of two
rights resting on shaky grounds; it is effectively an amalgamation of two
flimsy metals.
That fact alone would not be enough to find Solove's proposal
inadequate for the task at hand; after all, this Article argues that no
presently-recognized right is sufficient to the task. Solove's choice of
scrutiny, however, may also be incapable of protecting us from the
Orwell Act. As noted in Part IV.B.3, infra, intermediate scrutiny is too
malleable and precarious a standard for genuine protection in the wake of
another 9/11. It may fit well for threats less latent than sleeper-cell
terrorism, or threats that do not touch Equal Protection concerns so
closely (at least in the case of terrorism by those of a certain ethnic
descent or religious belief system), but it does not provide adequate
protection when the problem is hidden and the stakes are high. Solove's
198. Id. at Part IV.B.1 (manuscript at 41-44) (arguing that the First
Amendment should require the government to show "a substantial interest" and
"narrowly tailored" means of accomplishing it, including whether conformity with
Fourth Amendment procedural requirements is practicable).
199. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562-63 (2004) (holding that because
an officer "did not have in his possession a warrant particularly describing the things
he intended to seize, proceeding with the search was clearly 'unreasonable' under
the Fourth Amendment").
200. See supra Part II.A (discussing the demise of the warrant requirement).
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call for Fourth Amendment procedures unless there is a compelling
reason why such procedures would be impracticable may solve this
problem, but this solution amounts to a new standard of review that is
foreign to both the First and the Fourth Amendments. It may be overly
optimistic to expect the Supreme Court to apply intermediate scrutiny in
this novel manner and attach procedural requirements that apply to fewer
and fewer government actions in the pure Fourth-Amendment context,
let alone a First-Amendment context. If we cannot find a new manner of
examining the problem, one that mandates the application of traditional
strict scrutiny without hampering legitimate criminal investigations, then
we are left where we began: with a Constitution that may allow the
implementation and survival of Big Brother.
C. A New Possibility
Thus, we must find a new approach, one that fills the gaps in
those First Amendment doctrines that are already well-established. It
must render a chilling effect irrelevant, for such a claim would always
rest on the shaky grounds of standing and speculative evidence. It must
be broad enough to apply to all Americans, not merely those who are
members of groups engaging in political speech. And, to receive the
assurance of the highest First Amendment protection, it must create a
paradigm in which government surveillance is an act directed at speech
itself, rather than its secondary effects or its time, place, and manner. To
fashion a First Amendment right that would exclude government ears
from everyday conversations, we must look at the First Amendment from
a more fundamental perspective. We must look to the terms of the First
Amendment itself, and reexamine three fundamental questions: what is
the meaning of "speech," what is the meaning of "freedom," and what is
the meaning of "abridging"?
1. "Speech" and Audience
While the anonymous speech cases prove inadequate to fill the
gap, they hint at a crucial element of a new theory: the relationship
between the speaker, the verbal content of the speech, and the audience.
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Sociologist Erving Goffman wrote of the importance of audience in his
1959 classic, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.20 1 He found that
individuals tend to "play[] a part" for their observers, a part that depends
upon the individual, the audience, and the setting.202 Even if they play
that part without true conviction at first-for example, new military
recruits who feign enthusiasm and discipline because they are afraid of
punishment-the feigning ends over time and repeated practice in the
role, because they begin to believe that the role is genuine.203 Goffman
thus implies a connection between the speaker, the speech, the setting,
and the audience that cannot be severed; we cannot evaluate the message
without looking to these other factors, because the message is a function
of all of them. "Message," then, encompasses more than words or
conduct by the speaker-it includes the audience.
Logic verifies the importance of audience. The President may
address the topic of faith-based initiatives at two meetings, one with
religious conservatives and one with avowed atheists, and he may use the
exact same words, oratorical style, and body language at both events.
Nevertheless, each speech carries vastly different meaning based solely
on the members of the audience. A Neo-Nazi march through Skokie
carries different meaning than the same march through Duluth. The
question "will you marry me?" serves the same function regardless of
whether it takes place at a romantic restaurant or a private apartment or
on the Jumbotron at Lambeau Field, but the differences in setting and
audience change the nature and impact of the communication; that is, the
content of the communication shifts with its context, and the identity of
the audience is a primary element of that context. The identity of the
audience correspondingly affects the identity of the speaker, her ethos.
In Goffman's terms, it restricts the speaker's choice of what "part" she
wishes to "play" in expressing herself and thereby limits the ultimate
content of the messages she can convey.
Other works in the natural and social sciences further support a
close connection between the observer, the observed, and the content and
201. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1959).
202. Id. at 17-24 (alteration added).
203. Id. at 20.
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204
meaning of the resulting message. In the field of psychology, for
instance, aspiring researchers receive warning that they can
"unknowingly affect the outcome of a study by influencing the behavior
of the research participants," often by the mere fact of observation and
the observer's expectations.2 05  One oft-cited example of these
consequences of observation is the Hawthorne Effect, a term derived
from the results of a series of studies at the Western Electric Company's
206Hawthorne Works in Chicago from 1927 to 1932. The studies
monitored the work output of employees at the Works (with their
knowledge of the observation), implemented various changes to their
work environment, and noted that the workers' output improved
207
regardless of the precise changes implemented. After a period of time,
this change in workers' output became permanent: "something in the
reconditioning of the group must [have been] regarded as the permanent
204. See generally D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002) (describing the existence and
impact of "observer effects" that make truly objective and accurate analysis and fact-
finding difficult due to the relationship between the observer and the person or thing
under observation).
205. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 143 (Susan Gall ed., 1996). For
example:
Studies have shown that animals . . .may act differently
depending on the expectations of the experimenter. For
example, when experimenters expected rats to learn a
maze-running task quickly, the rats tended to do so; on the
other hand, animals expected not to learn quickly showed
slower learning. This difference in learning resulted even
when the animals were actually very similar; the
experimenter's expectations seemed to play a causal role in
producing the differences.
Id. For our purposes, this study suggests that people under surveillance may shape
their behavior and speech to fit their perceived expectations of the government in
carrying out the Orwell Act.
206. See Risinger et al., supra note 204, at 20 n.90 (2002) (noting use of the
term "Hawthorne Effect" to characterize the results of the study). See generally
ELTON MAYO, THE HUMAN PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION 52-94
(Viking Press, 5th Prtg. 1966) (1933) (describing studies at the Hawthorne Works).
207. MAYO, supra note 206, at 63 ("It had become clear that the itemized
changes experimentally imposed . . . could not be used to explain the major
change-the continually increasing production.").
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achievement." In short, the "interest of developing a new form of
scientific control . . . incidentally altered the total pattern" of the
workers' behavior. More disturbingly, the workers operated under the
illusion that the company subjected them to less supervision than before,
210
not more, even though they knew that their individual outputs were
subject to increased observation as a part of the study.211 Each worker
was, in a sense, "the principle of his own subjection. '212
If audience is an element of speech that affects the behavior and
message of the speaker, then these studies suggest that "mere
surveillance" does much more than the Court has previously suggested.
As long as people know they are under surveillance, then the government
inserts itself into the audience of all communications. By changing the
speakers' respective audiences in all communications, the government
essentially changes the speakers' communications; it distorts the
meaning of their message, and their experience of interaction. Private
talks between friends no longer carry the same meaning by the mere fact
they are no longer private talks between friends. The government's
attendance changes the meaning of the communication, even if the words
remain the same. Furthermore, the conditioning that accompanies years
of expression subject to known observation may subconsciously
condition speakers toward a pattern of behavior designed to please the
full audience-including the uninvited observer-as well as the intended
audience.
2. "Freedom" and the Choice of Audience
Merely recognizing that the audience is a part of speech itself is
only the first step, and it does not answer the ultimate question of
whether a widespread government surveillance program violates the First
Amendment. If we accept that the government is subtly changing the
meaning of speech through the passive surveillance of it, we must still
208. Id. at 69 (alteration added).
209. Id. at 70.
210. Id. at 75 ("Their opinion [regarding a sense of less supervision] is, of
course, mistaken: in a sense they are getting closer supervision than ever before, the
change is in the quality of the supervision.") (alteration added).
211. Id. at57.
212. FOUCAULT, supra note 131, at 203.
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ask whether "freedom" within the meaning of the First Amendment
encompasses the freedom from such intrusions; that is, what freedoms do
or should we have when it comes to the audience for our speech?
As Professor John Garvey notes, the First Amendment and the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments hold a
unique place in the constitutional framework because they offer
213
constitutional freedoms as well as constitutional protections. For
example, a state cannot take away the right to an abortion in certain
situations under the Fourteenth Amendment, nor can it require abortions.
The First Amendment's freedom of association "protects against
unjustified government interference with an individual's choice to enter
, ,. . ,214
into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships." The
government cannot require entry into these protected relationships, nor
can it prohibit entry. The Second Amendment, on the other hand, only
restricts the government from abridging the people's right to keep and
bear arms. The government does not have the power to ban all weapons
under the Second Amendment, but the Second Amendment is silent as to
whether the government could require people to carry them. At the heart
of constitutional freedoms (as opposed to protections), then, is choice-
the freedom to say, do, or believe something as well as the corresponding
freedom not to say, do, or believe it.
215
The Supreme Court has clearly defined speech as a constitutional
freedom, rather than a mere protection. People maintain the choice to
speak or remain silent; outside of relatively rare circumstances (such as
witnesses in court proceedings), the government cannot compel
216
speech. The Court views this right broadly: not only does it bar the
government from compelling direct speech, but in many circumstances it
bars the government from compelling indirect speech via mandatory
donations for political and ideological causes from people who
217fundamentally disagree with those causes. In addition, people
213. John H. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 1756, 1757-58 (1981).
214. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544
(1987).
215. Id.
216. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(striking down a West Virginia law requiring schoolchildren to salute the flag).
217. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
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maintain the right to choose which words to use in their communications,
from the eloquent to the profane: "[T]he usual rule [is] that governmental
bodies may not prescribe the form or content of individual
expression. ' 218 As for a person's chosen method for communicating his
message, the 'government may only restrict it through reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations. Even these regulations face intermediate
scrutiny, and they must leave open other channels for the
219
communication. In short, First Amendment protection for the freedom
of speech entails protection for the essential choices involved in
communication: to speak or remain silent, which words to use (or
whether to use words at all), and the chosen method of expression.
Each of the above choices directly relates to the speaker's
message. While the speaker cannot control her message once it reaches
others, she can control its content, its form, its style, and even whether to
convey a message at all. The choice of direct audience is at least as
fundamental as those already receiving great protection from the Court,
for two reasons. First, as shown above, the mere presence of an audience
can change the message: the same speech to religious conservatives and
to atheists may differ in message solely based on the makeup of the
audience. Second, the choice of audience interacts with these other
choices that are essential to conveying a message. If a speaker first
chooses a direct audience-for example, the choice to give a speech at a
high-school graduation-that choice will play a large role in dictating all
of the other choices fundamental to speech, such as the chosen words and
method of communication. If a speaker first makes another choice-say,
the choice of certain words to use to express her message-that choice
will play a large role in determining that speaker's choice of audience.
Cohen's choice of the words "Fuck the Draft" to convey his displeasure
with conscription2 20 restricted his choice of audience; he might have felt
that it was effectively shocking for passersby in the courthouse, but it is
unlikely he would have deemed it equally effective in a private dinner
with his grandparents.
Thus, the choice of audience is inextricably intertwined with
other choices that currently rest within the constitutional freedom of
218. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (alteration added).
219. See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
220. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
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speech. It stands to reason, then, that choice of audience warrants the
same protection from government interference. Of course, that choice
does differ from other choices relating to speech; unlike the choice of
what to say or whether to speak, the choice of audience is often outside
the speaker's control. A speaker may want a national audience but find
that it is impossible; his words only reach the passersby on the street (or
those who stumble upon his Internet blog). Similarly, he may wish to
speak only to those in his field of vision, without realizing that there is
someone else within earshot.
These distinctions fall away, however, when we remember
Goffman: audience is a part of speech only insofar as it remains within
the subjective awareness of the speaker and/or the listener, because it
affects the part that the speaker plays and the experience of the listener.
If Cohen wore his jacket to the courthouse and his grandmother walked
by him, seeing only the back of the jacket-neither person aware of the
identity of the other-then the message remains the same: a shocking
protest from an unidentified person in a symbolic location. If their eyes
happen to meet, the message as to those listeners changes according to
the context of their relationship, the roles that they have played toward
each other throughout their lives. The choice, then, is subjective as well
as objective: for both the speaker and the audience, it is the choice to
play a certain role that depends upon the identity and interaction of both,
and this choice warrants the same protections as other fundamental
choices related to speech.
This is not a drastic break from the Supreme Court's existing
First Amendment jurisprudence. Though the chilling-effect cases may
appear to have painted this proposed right into a comer, some precedent
shows that it would not take a major shift for the Court to save it. Such a
rescue would merely stand as a logical extension of other lines of
precedent. This precedent includes the Court's cases involving local
restrictions upon door-to-door solicitation for non-commercial221
purposes. These cases ultimately stand for the proposition that the
government abridges a speaker's freedom of speech when it interferes
221. For a detailed description of this long line of cases up to 1980, see Viii. of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 628-32 (1980) (describing
ten cases in detail and noting that these cases recognize "the reality that without
solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease").
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with her choice of audience, though they do not phrase their holdings
with this language. Take, for example, the Court's decision in Riley v.
National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina,222 a case striking
down a North Carolina law that, in relevant part, criminalized door-to-
door solicitation of charitable contributions by professional fundraisers
who did not obtain a license to solicit and who retained an
"unreasonable" amount of the actual donations as a fee for their
223fundraising efforts. The Court struck down this portion of the law as a
violation of the First Amendment because "[w]hether one views this as a
restriction of the charities' ability to speak, or a restriction of the
professional fundraisers' ability to speak, the restriction is undoubtedly
one on speech, and cannot be countenanced here. 224 This holding treats
the issue as if its resolution is obvious, but it does not address the
underlying question: why? What speech-related choice did North
Carolina abridge with this requirement? It certainly was not the choice
of the speakers' message; professional fundraisers and charities could
say the same messages in a different location or in a different manner
(for charities, using volunteer or low-fee fundraisers; for fundraisers, by
reducing their fees to a "reasonable" amount). Nor was it the choice to
speak or not to speak; there was no compelled speech in this part of the
law, and there was no compelled silence in the sense of broad bans on
certain messages generally. Further, the law did not silence certain
speakers on the basis of their messages rather than the context in which
they delivered them.
The effect of the law and the rationale of the case point largely to
a different choice: the speakers' choice of a certain audience for their
messages. The law was not purely directed at speech, but it was directed
at a charity's ability to reach a certain audience with that speech. In
effect, the fatal flaw of the law was its abridgement of a charity's choice
to reach a North Carolina audience: "This chill and uncertainty [of the
law] might well drive professional fundraisers out of North
Carolina... which will ultimately 'reduc[e] the quantity of
222. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
223. Id. at 784-86.
224. Id. at 794 (citations omitted) (alteration added).
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expression. Because "free and robust debate cannot thrive if
,,226directed by the government,' the Court applied "exacting First
Amendment scrutiny ''227 to this deprivation of a charity's and a
fundraiser's choice of audience.
We can see an even closer example of the Court's implicit
protection of a speaker's choice of audience in Buckley v. Valeo,228 a case
striking down several provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) of 1971. The Court began by noting that it "has never suggested
that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money
operates itself to introduce a non-speech element or to reduce the
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment., 229 This statement
makes little sense without consideration of the choice of audience as a
part of the freedom of speech. Speech, in and of itself, is free; there is no
tax on mere talking. Directing that speech in a manner that captures a
broad audience, however, is not. If the above-quoted characterization of
the law is to have some meaning, it must be referring to the speaker's
choice of audience.
Such an interpretation also clarifies the several holdings in the
case. The Court struck down the expenditure limits on candidates,
campaigns, and non-candidate individuals and groups advocating
election or defeat of a candidate (that is, the speakers themselves)
because they would "necessarily reduce[] the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached."230 It upheld the restriction upon
the amount that individuals can, donate directly to candidates because it
was essentially a restriction upon speech enablers rather than the
speakers themselves; it required candidates to seek contributions from
more individuals to obtain the funds to reach their chosen audiences, but
this alone was not enough to show "any dramatic adverse effect on the
funding of campaigns and political associations 2 3 1 that would
225. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam)) (first
alteration added).
226. Id. at 791.
227. Id. at 789.
228. 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
229. Id. at 16.
230. Id. at 19 (emphasis added) (alteration added).
231. Id. at21.
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"undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective
discussion. Thus, candidates still retained the "unfettered opportunity
to make their views known ' 233 to their chosen audience, and the public
enjoyed the "'unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes.'
234
It also explains the Court's application of "exacting scrutiny
' 235
to FECA's public disclosure requirements for campaign financing.
These requirements "appear[ed] to be the least restrictive means of
curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress
found to exist, '236 and the government interests-the protection of the
democratic process-were "sufficiently important' 237 to survive that
scrutiny. In short, Buckley also supplies precedent for applying strict
scrutiny not only when the government takes action restricting a speaker
from reaching his intended audience, but also when the government takes
action requiring a speaker (in this case, someone engaging in the speech-
act of donating to a political campaign) to reach a larger audience than
the speaker may have intended. Of course, given that the Court upheld
this particular FECA provision, the possibility remains that the Court
applied strict scrutiny in name only and instead took a results-oriented
approach akin to Korematsu. Nevertheless, the language of strict
scrutiny survives its dubious application in Buckley, and it shows that the
Court is willing to give its strongest constitutional protection against
government interference with a speaker's choice of audience.
3. From Limiting Choice to Abridging Pure Speech
The precedent above supports the idea of choice of audience as
speech, but it does not confront the problem that has thwarted many of
the previously discussed claims: the fact that the Orwell Act provides no
concrete, non-speculative penalties for any kind of speech directed
toward any particular audience. As a result, this new approach remains
232. Id. at 29.
233. Id. at 52-53.
234. Id. at 49 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964)).
235. Id. at 64.
236. Id. at 68 (alteration added).
237. Id. at 66.
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vulnerable to arguments that some forms of government surveillance
belong, at most, in the category of laws that have an incidental impact on
speech and thus face only intermediate scrutiny. As noted previously,
the Court's relaxation of narrow-tailoring requirements in this standard
of review leaves courts with too much room to maneuver, and this lower
standard might save the Orwell Act. Thus, even if audience is an
element of speech, and even if the choice of that audience is one that is
fundamental to the exercise of free speech, this new approach must
finally answer the ultimate question: does government surveillance
actually abridge the freedom of speech in a way that would subject it to
strict scrutiny? In other words, does this new approach allow us to view
laws that provide for government surveillance as laws directed at speech,
rather than merely laws that have an indirect impact on speech?
The government could certainly argue that the law is not directed
at speech, and, at first blush, that argument carries great weight. The
intent of the lawmakers was clearly the preservation of national security,
with no designs on suppressing speech; among those people that the law
was designed to stop, loose lips are actually the key to detection. In
addition, people still maintain a choice of audience. They can speak to
whomever they want. They can speak to no one at all. Government
agents are not physically standing over their shoulders and inevitably
changing the makeup of the audience and nature of their messages, and
the government could argue-as in the chilling-effect cases-that any
limitation on the parts available for speakers to play, or difference in the
meaning of communications for speakers and listeners, is self-imposed.
In short, "mere surveillance" provides no coercion whatsoever, and the
government cannot be held responsible for people's psychological
impressions of it.
To combat this argument, a new approach must put the choice of
audience in starker terms, recognizing that the power to choose an
audience includes the power to exclude, the power to speak outside the
presence of the government. In this light, when the government invades
a speaker's direct audience through known surveillance, it eliminates a
speaker's ability to choose a private audience-it creates a sort of
"medium ban" on private speech. But this kind of ban goes even further
than a mere ban on the means of transmitting certain messages; it
effectively eliminates the very possibility of such messages through any
means of communication. Given the relationship between audience and
298 [Vol. 5
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message, the inability to choose a private audience bans whatever impact
a message may gain by the fact that it is beyond government ears, and
thus wholly eliminates certain communications that would carry a
slightly different meaning if made in the absence of surveillance.
The mere fact that the government does not utilize coercion is
irrelevant, because the Orwell Act accomplishes the same ends that
coercion would in the absence of such technology. If the government
simply required, upon the threat of criminal prosecution, that people
disclose all communications they make to the government, no one could
say that the threat of government coercion did not abridge the freedom of
speech as we have defined it. The simple fact that the government has
perfected a system that renders coercion unnecessary should not save a
system that has the same basic impact upon the freedom of speech. In
addition, the fact that the government had no intention to abridge the
freedom of speech should not save its surveillance program from strict
scrutiny. If the audience is an element of speech itself, then the
government's constant inclusion in that audience is not a mere "time,
place, and manner" restriction-it is the wholesale elimination of certain
content, and it is directed at speech itself regardless of governmental
motives to use it for other purposes. In this way, if a speaker cannot
communicate confidentially due to government surveillance, the
government has effectively and directly abridged her freedom of speech.
D. The New Constitutional Freedom in Practice and Theory
Of course, this framework would not give citizens the absolute
right to dictate the makeup of their audiences, just as the First
Amendment does not give speakers an absolute right as to the substance
of their messages and the forms in which they convey them. But it
would provide a First Amendment right against government interference
with a speaker's chosen audience, secure in the ample protection of strict
scrutiny, because it amounts to interfering with the speaker's choice in
conveying his message. This would mean that the government could not
scan emails, tap telephones, or record conversations without probable
cause (the minimum showing required to significantly restrict other
constitutional freedoms, such as one's physical liberty, in criminal
investigations). While the government's interest in crime prevention and
detection is almost always compelling, probable cause could in most
2007]
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cases allow surveillance to pass a "least-restrictive-means" analysis,
assuming the surveillance was limited to methods that were reasonably
likely to bear evidence of criminal activity. If the government must
show probable cause to take away a person's physical liberty and place
him in custody, which can lead to curtailment of other constitutionally
protected choices (such as the choice to vote or abstain from voting), it
should require probable cause to conduct surveillance-a search, for
Fourth Amendment purposes-that eliminates his choice of a private
audience.
It is this choice of a private audience that would limit the scope
of this constitutional protection. The right would have no impact on
police presence at large rallies for crowd-control purposes, because the
nature of those events is public: the government cannot interfere with the
speaker's message through its attendance if the speaker's audience is the
public generally. But when the speaker chooses to communicate in a
setting that evinces a desire for an audience smaller than the general
public, the government could not alter the makeup of the audience
through its unwanted attendance in an official capacity.
This does not mean that the government must promote speech;
one could not argue that the government interferes with her choice of
audience because it does not let her address the Senate at will. Nor does
it mean that it must abandon FCC decency standards or require agents of
the government to wear earplugs and blindfolds as they go about their
daily lives, lest they witness or overhear others' semi-private
communications. The government would not have to foster speakers'
wishes for a certain audience to hear a certain message. It simply could
not actively and purposefully interfere with that choice once the choice
has been made, absent a showing that doing so amounts to the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest.
Applying this principle to ACLU v. National Security
238Agency -the most recent case with claims analogous to those the Anti-
Orwellians make in this hypothetical-we find that such broad
surveillance must fall, but for reasons different from those cited by the
district court. The plaintiffs in that case were news reporters, lawyers,
and academics who challenged the NSA's post-9/11 policy of
238. 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). For a description of the holding
in this case, see supra text accompanying note 154.
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intercepting telephone and Internet communications to and from people
in the Middle East, without a warrant. 239  Such an invasion of these
plaintiffs' audience would certainly implicate their First Amendment
right to choose an audience, as defined above, and it would warrant strict
scrutiny. The government could not meet that analysis under the facts of
this case. While the governmental interest is probably compelling, the
facts of the case showed no evidence that this surveillance was the least
restrictive means to accomplish that end; the government made no
showing that the same ends could not be met through different means
(such as the use of informants or obtaining a warrant for wiretaps against
those individuals whom it had probable cause to suspect of terrorist
involvement). Under this new First Amendment principle, the decision
in this case would be brief, certain, and well-grounded. It would not
require the twenty-eight pages of dubious analysis employed by the
district court to strike down the program, nor would it require the unique
240facts .the case presented.
In this way, a First Amendment right against government
interference with a speaker's chosen audience closes the Orwellian
Loophole. But it also fits within a larger free-speech principle,
regardless of the argument for protecting free speech. Frederick Schauer
has catalogued the most oft-used justifications for heightened protection
239. Id. at 758.
240. For example, the plaintiffs avoided the standing problem by the unique
fact that those Mid-East contacts upon which they relied for their professional
livelihood actually refused to speak with them as a result of the program. Id. at 767.
Those contacts were not American citizens or parties to the suit, and thus the court
did not have to evaluate the reasonableness of their fears of surveillance. It was their
chill, not the plaintiffs', that was at issue; as the court noted, "Laird does not control
this case." Id. at 768. As to the court's reasoning with regard to the Fourth and First
Amendments, it ignores the possibility of special needs or other exceptions to the
warrant requirement in finding that the program is "obviously in violation of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 775. For the reasons expressed in Part II, supra, such a
finding is not nearly as "obvious" as the district court believed. Further, the district
court's First Amendment holding expressly depended upon its finding of a Fourth
Amendment violation. Id. at 776. From the language of the decision, it is difficult
to know whether the district court would have found a violation of the First
Amendment had it not found a violation of the Fourth Amendment. As a result, one
should not read the decision as standing for strong First Amendment protection
against government surveillance, but rather as precedent for analytically
questionable Fourth Amendment protection from it.
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of free expression, finding that they fall into four major categories: an
"argument from truth" (that is, to find truth we must have a free
exchange of ideas), 241 an "argument from democracy" (that is, free
speech serves the function of republican governance by promoting a
242dialogue between citizens and their elected leaders), an argument that
free speech is an "intrinsic good" (that is, it enables us to fulfill our1 • x243
potential as human beings and leads to happiness), and a closely
related argument that it promotes individuality, dignity, and autonomy
(that is, it provides a vehicle for defining ourselves). 244 Each of these
justifications for supporting a strong right to free speech generally also
supports the specific right against government surveillance of that
speech.
First, this extension of the First Amendment receives support
from the "marketplace-of-ideas" or Millian "argument-from-truth"
justifications for free speech because it adds to the diversity of audiences,
and therefore the diversity of messages. If people naively cling to beliefs
because "they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of
those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons
may have to say,"245 then removing the government as observer can only
add to the number of messages available to them because it adds to the
choices available to speakers in conveying their messages.
For example, imagine a fair that showcases speakers from a wide
variety of viewpoints, with small gatherings around each. Wandering
from speaker to speaker and listening to each carries different meaning
when one does it alone than when one does so with a uniformed police
officer following at her shoulder. She will likely think about the police
officer's presence, and so will the speakers she visits. They may change
their messages (to make them either more anti-law-enforcement or less),
she may subconsciously change the way she receives the messages, and,
even if neither changes, the mere presence of the officer changes the
opportunities available to the speakers in conveying their messages
because they have no choice but to include the government in their
241. See SCHAUER, supra note 188, at 15-25.
242. Id. at 35-40.
243. Id. at 49-50.
244. Id. at 60-72.
245. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 36 (Hackett Pub. Co. 1978) (1859).
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audiences. Thus, instead of hearing a number of viewpoints on a variety
of subjects, each speaker's message travels through the filter of the law-
enforcement officer's presence, where it gives new meaning to the words
from the perspective of both speaker and listener. Removing this filter
may enable one to come closer to a true understanding of the speaker's
intended message because the speaker has a fuller array of choices
available to him in conveying this message-or, at least, an
understanding of his message untainted by the intrusion of an unwanted
and unintended member of his audience.
This right also receives self-evident support from what Schauer
describes as the argument from democracy, an approach derived from the
246philosophy of Alexander Meiklejohn. Massive surveillance has been a
common characteristic of some of the most totalitarian regimes in human
history, with good reason: it is a convenient tool for detecting and
controlling ideas threatening to the ruling powers. In addition, the threat
of government surveillance may perform one of two functions: it might
discourage people from spreading ideas that may imperil those in power,
or it may transform the way listeners perceive these ideas so that they
appear less attractive or more extreme than they would without
government surveillance. Meiklejohn's theory calls for a First
Amendment that allows "citizens ... so far as possible, [to] understand
the issues which bear upon our common life,, 247 offering the traditional
New England town meeting as the epitome of a democratic free-speech
principle in action. While "government" is in some sense present in
Meiklejohn's "town meeting" analogy, the government itself is the
intended audience at such a meeting, and it carries no implicit threat of
coercion or future investigation. In situations in which citizens seek to
exclude coercive authorities from their discussions of issues, this
exclusion can only add to variety and understanding. Thus, a right
against government interference with the speaker's audience can only
promote Meiklejohn's vision of democracy.
Finally, this right also promotes the two remaining goals of self-
actualization and individuality because it gives the individual a private
246. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing that free and open public discussion protects
self-government by educating both the citizenry and its elected leaders).
247. Id. at 88-89 (alteration added).
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space, and it gives her control over when to step outside of it and who to
include when she does. If "communication and the use of language are
vital components of humanity, 248 then a government audience that
changes the meaning of speech removes a part of our very existence; we
lose some control over our ability to express ourselves in every situation,
and thus we "become soulless automatons. 249
CONCLUSION
Our Constitution should not sanction this transformation, this
enablement of the government to effectively poison the souls of a free
people. Nevertheless, modem precedent has given birth to the Orwellian
Loophole; it has nourished it; it has left it ready for us to unleash when
the right combination of circumstances make it seem attractive. But the
First Amendment offers hope of defeating this emerging threat to
democratic values, if the Court will recognize that a speaker's choice of
audience is as fundamental to speech as the speaker's choice of words,
choice of medium, and choice to speak at all, and that this choice is just
as capable of changing the meaning of speech. This recognition would
not guarantee that the United States would never slide into dystopia. But
it would give some assurance that we will not someday awake from
dreams of permanent national security, only to find ourselves living the
Orwellian nightmare.
248. SCHAUER, supra note 188, at 54.
249. Fromm, supra note 186, at 257.
